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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
I. INTRODUCTION

The basic concept of anti-discrimination is one on which all can
agree. After all, we prefer to be judged by our individual abilities
rather than some characteristic that we cannot--or should not
have to-mask or change, such as our race, gender, or age. The
reality of the workplace is more complex and resists the straightforward application of this simple anti-discrimination principle.
The prohibition against discrimination on the basis of race is one
of our most widely accepted implementations of the antidiscrimination principle. The anti-discrimination principle is
complex as it applies to race. Additional levels of complexity are
added as the principle is extended beyond race. The list of groups
that fall under the anti-discrimination rubric has proven fluid to
some extent. Federal employment laws prohibit discrimination on
the basis of race, gender, religion, national origin, age, and disability. State employment laws further expand this group to include discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, marital
status, and medical condition, among others.' This article looks at
the expansion of anti-discrimination law to include older workers
and the tensions this expansion has created in antidiscrimination law. While anti-discrimination theory applies in a
multitude of contexts, such as voting and fair housing, this article
is limited to anti-discrimination law as it has developed in the
employment context.2 At what point does the employer's right to
employ at will, or in some cases, at whim, cross the line into prohibited discrimination?
Anti-discrimination law,3 primarily an outgrowth of the Civil
Rights Movement, was designed first and foremost to address the
persistent race discrimination and subordination of African
1. California law prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of "race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical
condition, marital status, sex, age, or sexual orientation." CAL. Gowr CODE § 12940 (West
Supp. 2004).
2. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited discrimination or segregation in places of
public accommodation, public facilities, federally assisted programs, education, and employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000).
3. I use the term anti-discrimination law to refer to legal protections that arise out of
constitutional equal protection jurisprudence and statutory analysis. The relevant statutes include section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000); title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (2000) [hereinafter Title
VII]; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000)
[hereinafter ADEA] and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336,
104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter ADA].

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:839

Americans.4 The development of anti-discrimination law in the
employment context was designed and applied with the elimination of race discrimination in mind. The expansion of antidiscrimination law to older workers has taken place within a legal system that encourages groups to present themselves as
"similar to" African Americans.5 The more dissimilar the groups,
however, the more difficult it is to hold the fundamental antidiscrimination principles together in a coherent whole. Dissimilarities among groups protected under the umbrella of antidiscrimination laws raise concerns about whether the law should
be applied equally to the new group as well as the old and
whether the law adequately addresses the unique problems of the
new group. For example, language and accent discrimination do
not fit neatly into an anti-discrimination model primarily designed to eradicate race discrimination.6
The law provides an imperfect mechanism for making nuanced
distinctions between theory and application. In theory, at least,
discrimination is discrimination whether directed at racial groups
or older workers. In the application of these laws, however, courts
often make distinctions and apply anti-discrimination doctrines

4. With good reason, anti-discrimination law has expanded beyond its historical origins-primarily as a remedy to race discrimination-to protect groups that have faced a
similar history of animus and subordination. Anti-discrimination laws typically protect
women, religious minorities, ethnic minorities, and the physically challenged.
5. I use the terms "African American" and "black" interchangeably. I sometimes use
the term "black" because I am sensitive to the concerns raised by my non-American born,
but black-identified friends. I also use the term "African American" to acknowledge the
important links to our African ancestry. Occasionally, I use the term "people of color" or
"workers of color" to signal that my critique is not limited to a black/white context but often applies to other racial groups as well.
6. Professor Perea demonstrates the inadequacy of Title VII's prohibition against
"national origin" discrimination to address many of the types of discrimination faced by
ethnic minorities. Juan F. Perea, Ethinicity and Prejudice:Reevaluating "NationalOrigin"
DiscriminationUnder Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 805, 809-10 (1994). Perea argues
that discrimination is more likely to occur against persons because of "ethnic traits" (the
perceptible manifestations of ethnic difference such as language or accent) than because of
"national origin" (meaning the country of origin of the person or the person's ancestors).
Id.; see also Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the Garcia Cousins Lost Their Accents:
Understandingthe Language of Title VII Decisions Approving English-Only Rules as the
Product of Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 10 LA RAZA L.J.
261, 269-70 (1998) (arguing that Title VII's civil rights model is based on a black/white
paradigm that does not adequately address the importance of language issues to Latinos);
Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, AntidiscriminationLaw, and a Jurisprudence
for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L. J. 1329, 1384-87 (1991) (critiquing Title VII jurisprudence's insistence on uniformity in speech pattern and recognizing that the demand for
uniformity masks a hidden assumption of an Anglo accent at the center and that such assumptions contribute to the subordination of non-whites).
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differently depending on the group seeking protection. The more
dissimilar the groups, the greater the dissonance between the
theory as developed and the law as applied. The expansion of
anti-discrimination law to older workers illustrates this phenomenon. Extending the anti-discrimination norm to older workers has led to an explosion of litigation. Indeed, older workers are
the fastest growing group of discrimination plaintiffs.7
This article explores the difficulty of applying general antidiscrimination principles to the uniquely positioned group of
older workers. Older workers face challenges in the workplace
different from those faced by workers of color. Age itself is a temporal concept. It is a group to which each of us, at least potentially, will belong.8 Older workers transition from insiders (valued
employees) to outsiders (devalued and/or obsolete employees)
sometimes based on nothing more than the inevitable passage of
time. Workers of color, on the other hand, never achieved "insider" status.9 Black workers continue to experience barriers to
full integration into the workplace. Older workers have not faced
a history of subordination similar to that of African Americans,
for example.1 ° These dissimilarities are reflected in the law as
applied.
Courts tend to narrow anti-discrimination theories in age
cases. While both intentional and unintentional discrimination
potentially violate anti-discrimination law as it applies to race,
courts are divided as to whether unintentional discrimination vio-

7. Age discrimination cases are one of the fastest growing areas of employment litigation. In 2003, age discrimination claims accounted for 23.5% of individual charges filed
with the EEOC, as compared to 25.4% for individual charges filed under Title VII for all
types of discrimination. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, CHARGE
STATISTICS FY 1992 THROUGH FY 2003, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html
(last modified Mar. 8, 2003) [hereinafter EEOC Charge Statistics].
8. Each of us, of course, has a race, or races, but racial categorizations are generally
held to be immutable.
9. For a description of the insider/outsider distinction, see, for example, Devon W.
Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000).
10. Title VII generally protects historically disadvantaged groups who have faced historical animus and persistent social and economic disadvantage. The elderly as a group
have not faced the same type of animus and persistent social and economic disadvantage.
The elderly as a group tend to be wealthier than traditionally defined disadvantaged
groups. See generally Larry Polivka, In Florida the Future is Now: Aging Issues and Policies in the 1990s, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 401, 423-24 (1991) (quoting Employee Benefit Research Institute, Trends and Issues in Early Retirement, 103 EBRI IssUE BRIEF 1 (June
1990)) (discussing retirement trends and citing "minority women" as older citizens who
will need continued employment throughout their later years)).
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lates federal age discrimination law.11 While the cost of a racially
diverse workforce is generally considered irrelevant, costs of older
workers are relevant considerations for many courts. 2 Some of
these differences in application (but not all) can be attributed to
differences in statutory language among the various civil rights
statutes. But, minor differences in statutory language do not provide a satisfactory explanation of how these laws are applied by
courts. I argue that differences between general anti-discrimination principles as stated and as applied also reflect the inevitable tension caused by attempts to apply a uniform model of antidiscrimination theory to dissimilar groups. Accepted principles of
legal reasoning dictate that the legal protections should only extend to similarly situated groups. These principles dictate that
those seeking to extend anti-discrimination protections beyond
race should present themselves as "like" race. But, some groups
are more "like" race than others. The failure to recognize relevant
differences between groups can have the unintended effect of undermining fundamental principles of anti-discrimination law. 3
This is a process I call "cross-contamination."
Cross-contamination consists of two related problems-an "import" problem and an "export" problem. An import problem is created when doctrines developed to deal primarily with race discrimination are adopted and applied to deal with discrimination
facing other groups. Importing these concepts assumes that the
two groups are very similar. To the extent that a particular group
has faced a similar history of discriminatory treatment in employment as African Americans, use of a similar legal framework
to eradicate such discrimination is justified. But, where the manifestations and reasons for discrimination are more pronounced,
as between age and race, for example, forcing age discrimination
into a race model ignores those situations where the race model
does not address the particular problems of older workers.

11. See infra notes 156-66 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
13. This phenomenon is not limited to discrimination arising under different statutes,
such as the ADEA and Title VII, but occurs within Title VII as well. Professor Hebert
demonstrates how restrictive concepts developed in sexual harassment cases have been
imported into racial harassment cases. See Camille Hebert, Analogizing Race and Sex in
Workplace Harassment Claims, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 819, 820 (1997) ("[1legal standards refined
and given substance in connection with sexual harassment claims.., have made it increasingly difficult to establish" a racial harassment claim.).
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At the same time, the danger of creating an export problem
also exists. The export problem occurs when concepts developed
to tailor anti-discrimination law for one group (such as older
workers) intentionally or unintentionally become part of the more
general anti-discrimination model and then are applied inappropriately to anti-discrimination protections for other groups (such
as racial groups). I argue that the focus on treating older workers
as "like" black workers fails to fully address the unique problems
of older workers in the workforce. Further, the emphasis on treating older workers and black workers similarly tends to marginalize the experiences of black workers.
Part II of this article describes the role analogy-based legal
reasoning plays in encouraging social groups to present themselves as "like" another group in order to get the benefit of established legal rights. Part III describes the evolution and codification of anti-discrimination principles, focusing on the passage of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the early cases interpreting the Act and shows that the model that developed was
particularly "race" focused. Part IV describes the process by
which anti-discrimination principles, developed in the context of
race discrimination cases, were adopted into age discrimination
jurisprudence and explores the genesis of restrictive concepts designed to tailor race-based doctrine to fit age-related problems.
Part V describes the dangers of cross-contamination-the failure
of the race model to adequately address problems facing older
workers and the danger of restrictive concepts developed in the
age context being used to undercut anti-discrimination law as it
applies to race.
II. THE ROLE OF ANALOGY IN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW
Basic principles of legal reasoning and the operation of the
American legal system encourage the strategy of focusing on the
similarities between groups. Principles of analogous reasoningthe process of comparing items to adduce a relevant similarityallow legal principles developed in one context to apply to similar
questions as they arise. American law's reliance on "precedent"based legal reasoning is one such application of reasoning by
analogy. An equally important principle of reasoning by analogy
is that one must take relevant differences into account. Antidiscrimination law, however, provides no mechanism for making
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such distinctions. Anti-discrimination principles are often mechanically applied without sufficient exploration of difference.
A. Use of Analogies Lends Moral Force in Support of Extending
the Law to New Groups
Analogies are important legal reasoning tools. They can lead to
a greater understanding of another group's struggles.1 4 On the
other hand, failure to acknowledge dissimilarities can result in
marginalization. Professors Grillo and Wildman demonstrate this
point with respect to analogies between race and sex discrimination. They describe how comparisons of sexism to racism often
marginalize the experiences of people of color. In particular, they
state that "[iin each setting, although the analogy was made for
the purpose of illumination, to explain sexism and sex discrimination, another unintended result ensued-the perpetuation of
racism/white supremacy. When a speaker compared sexism and
racism, the significance of race was marginalized and obscured .... , 1 5 Similarly, analogies between age and race can tend
to marginalize the experiences of people of color while at the
same time masking the unique experiences of older workers.
The process of comparing items to adduce a relevant similarity
("argument by analogy"16 ) is a fundamental principle of reasoning. 7 By comparing two items that share some properties one can
infer that they share some further property." In order for an argument by analogy to have rational force (yield a reliable judgment about the truth of its conclusion based on the assumed
truth of its premises), "there must be sufficient warrant to believe
that the presence in an 'analogized' item of some particular char-

14. See Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuringthe Importance of Race: The
Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other-Isms), 1991
DUKE L.J. 397, 398 (1991) ("Analogies provide U both the key to greater comprehension [of
oppression] and the danger of false understanding."); see also Lynne Henderson, Legality
and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1581 n.37 (1987) ("Analogizing, or drawing upon
one's own experience to understand another's feelings or experiences, is a part of relating
to another .... One could otherwise not empathize with another's grief at losing a parent
at all if one could not draw on one's own experiences of loss.. .
15. See Grillo & Wildman, supra note 14, at 399.
16. Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning, Semantics: Pragmatics, and the Rational
Forceof Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923, 926 (1996).
17. See id. at 962-75, 1016-18 (discussing the basic model for analogical argument).
18. See id. at 1006.
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acteristic or characteristics allows one to infer the presence in
that item of some particular other characteristic."1 9
Once a group is successful in acquiring support for a legal right
or benefit, such as the right not to be discriminated against, that
right enjoys a privileged position in the law. 2° When seeking to
establish new rights or benefits, new groups seek to take advantage of the privileged position of an existing right by framing
their claims as analogous to the existing beneficiaries' claims.2 1 In
the context of anti-discrimination, application of this principle
permits new groups to argue that from the shared characteristic
of pay disparities and under-representation in the workforce for
example, one can infer that the cause for such outcomes is discrimination. By presenting themselves as "like" race, older workers are able to take advantage of established rights and bene22
fits.
B. FailureTo Acknowledge Difference Can Undermine the Moral
Force of Analogy
Recognition of dissimilarities is an equally important principle
In an argument
of reasoning. This is argument by disanalogy
by disanalogy, there is a relevant dissimilarity between the target and the source that is sufficient to justify giving the second
group a different legal treatment than the first received.2 4 In the
anti-discrimination context, the law must also consider whether
there is a relevant dissimilarity between the target (black workers) and the source (older workers) to justify different legal
treatment for age-based employment decisions. As one court de-

19.

Id. at 965.

20. This precedent-based system has been justified for utilitarian reasons (to fail to
treat similar cases similarly is arbitrary and therefore unjust or unfair) and efficiency reasons (it is too burdensome to establish new rules in every case). See EVA H. HANKS, ET AL.,
ELEMENTS OF LAW 149-94 (1994).

21. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, When Substance Mandates Procedure: Martin v.
Wilkes and the Rights of Vested Incumbents in Civil Rights Consent Decrees, 77 CORNELL
L. REV. 189, 215-18 (1992) (discussing the treatment of tenure as a property right).
22. See Samuel Issacharoff & Erica Worth Harris, Is Age DiscriminationReally Age
Discrimination?:The ADEA's UnnaturalSolution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 780, 808 (1997) (noting the shift in the EEOC from primarily race and gender discrimination claims to an increasing number of age discrimination claims).
23. Professor Brewer describes this type of argument as "argument by disanalogy."
Brewer, supra note 16, at 1006.
24. See id. at 1006-16.
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creed, the fact "[t]hat the law [ADEA] is embodied in a separate
act and has its own unique history at least counsel[s] the examiner to consider the particular problems sought to be reached by
the statute."25 Yet, in legal discourse, analogous reasoning is often a one-way street. Precedential legal reasoning does encourage
recognition of factual and legal distinction. These distinctions are
addressed on a case-by-case method and do not necessarily lend
themselves to a more generalized and well-reasoned alternative
structure.
C. The Experiences of Older Workers and Workers of Color Are
Disanalogousin CertainRespects
Both older workers and workers of color have suffered from
diminished employment opportunities because of employer discrimination. But, the history and treatment of older workers and
workers of color in the labor force are dissimilar in several respects.
1. Race, Segregation, and Subordination
Race and age discrimination arise out of very different social
and historical contexts. Title VII was originally designed to address the legacy of American racism, which is rooted in an American history symbolized by slavery and subordination.26 Laws protecting workers of color came about as a result of a national
movement to end segregation. Older workers have not faced a
similar history of slavery and subordination." Unlike the social/political climate driving protections for African Americans,
there was no nationwide social mobilization or national consensus that heralded the passage of the ADEA.28 That is not to say
that older workers have not faced widespread discrimination. Be-

25. Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 312 (6th Cir. 1975).
26. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
27. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
28. Popular support is, of course, not the only stick by which we should measure the
necessity for laws to redress legal wrongs. On the contrary, the American system of government-with three separate branches of power, including lifetime appointment of Supreme Court justices and election of Senators to six-year terms-helps in the enactment
and upholding of laws for the good of the electorate, even where unpopular, rather than
bow to the winds of popular change. But laws passed with popular support face less resistance over implementation.
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fore the ADEA, ageism operated in full view of American society.
Many employers adopted formal policies forcing workers to retire
at a certain age and refusing to hire workers over a certain age.29
The ADEA was passed to remove such barriers. But barriers to
older workers are attributed to reliance on unwarranted stereotypes rather than a widespread distaste of older workers in general.
2. Age and Stereotypes
Motivations for age-based decisions overlap but are not necessarily coextensive with the motivations for race-based decisions.
Race discrimination" arises from multiple impulses. Race-based
actions may be based on conscious or unconscious animus toward
blacks, a conscious or unconscious need to subordinate on the basis of race, or reliance on inaccurate stereotypes. Federal employment laws sought to confront American racism by outlawing
certain employer motivations based on stereotypes and prejudice.
Studies on workplace behavior suggest that ageism in the
workplace is often based on stereotypes, rather than prejudice.
One study found that older workers were rated better than average in such categories as performance, attitude, and turnover,
but these same workers were rated worse in flexibility, health
care costs, and suitability for training.3 ' Federal employment
laws prohibiting age discrimination were directed at outlawing

29. A 1965 Department of Labor study found that, in those states that did not prohibit setting age-specific limits for employment, over one-half of all employers applied age
limitations (forty-five to fifty-five, typically); one-half of all private sector job openings
were closed to applicants over fifty-five years of age, and one-fourth would not hire applicants over forty-five. Older workers represented less than five percent of new hires in
most businesses. U.S. Dept. of Labor, The Older American Worker, Report of the Secretary
of Labor to the Congress Under Section 715 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, at 6-7 (1965)
[hereinafter The Older American Worker].
30. Although difficult to define, racism incorporates three interrelated termsstereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination. See JAMES WALLER, FACE TO FACE: THE
CHANGING STATE OF RACISM ACROSS AMERICA 25 (1998). Discrimination is the behavioral

manifestation of stereotypes and prejudice. Id. Stereotypes are cognitive shortcuts that
help the brain to process complex information by attributing characteristics to an individual based on the individual's group membership. Id. at 28. Prejudice has to do with attitudes, positive or negative, toward an individual because of the individual's membership
in a specific group. Id. at 33.
31. Robert McCann & Howard Giles, Ageism in the Workplace: A CommunicationPerspective, in AGEISM: STEREOTYPING AND PREJUDICE AGAINST OLDER PERSONS 171 (Todd D.
Nelson ed., 2002).
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arbitrary discrimination against older workers, including actions
based on inaccurate stereotypes.
The legislative history of the ADEA itself notes some fundamental differences between age and race discrimination. 2 In his
report to Congress, the Secretary of Labor made a special point of
distinguishing the possible causes and consequences of age discrimination from race discrimination:
The Nation has faced the fact-rejecting inherited prejudice or contrary conviction-that people's ability and usefulness is unrelated to
the facts of their race, or color, or religion, or sex, or the geography of
their birth. Having accepted this truth, the easy thing to do would be
simply to extend the conclusions derived from it to the problem of
discrimination in employment based on aging, and be done with the
matter. This would be easy-and wrong.

A study conducted by the Labor Secretary before the passage
the ADEA identified four different factors that tend to result
age discrimination in employment: (1) dislike or intolerance
older workers;34 (2) arbitrary discrimination;" (3) where there

of
in
of
is

32. The House Report specifically recognized the employer's interest in achieving
some age balance in the workforce. H.R. Rep. No. 90-805, at 7 (1967), reprinted in 1967
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2219.
33. The Older American Worker, supra note 29, at 1.
The gist of the matter is that "discrimination" means something very
different, so far as employment practices involving age are concerned, from
what it means in connection with discrimination involving-for examplerace....

Employment discrimination because of race is identified, in the general
understanding of it, with non-employment resulting from feelings about people entirely unrelated to their ability to do the job. There is no significant discrimination of this kind so far as older workers are concerned.
The most closely related kind of discrimination in the non-employment of
older workers involves their rejection because of assumptions about the effect
of age on their ability to do a job when there is in fact no basis for these assumptions.
Id. at2.
34. Id. at 5-6.
35. Id. at 2; see also Bruce J. Avolio & Gerald V. Barrett, Effects of Age Stereotyping
in a Simulated Interview, 2 PSYCHOL. & AGING 56 (1987) (finding that simulated interviews suggest older job applicants will receive lower interview ratings than younger applicants or applicants whose age is not designated); Douglas T. Hall & Philip H. Mirvis, The
New Workplace and Older Workers, in AGING AND COMPETITION: REBUILDING THE U.S.

WORKFORCE 78-81 (James A. Auerbach & Joyce C. Welsh eds., 1994) (discussing barriers
to retention of older workers); McCann & Giles, supra note 32, at 163-99. Other studies
have shown the effect of ageist behavior on the employment opportunities for older workers, especially a reluctance to train older workers. See JEROME M. ROSOW & ROBERT
ZAGER, THE FUTURE OF OLDER WORKERS IN AMERICA: NEW OPTIONS FOR AN EXTENDED

WORKING LIFE 97-103 (1980) (stating that negative stereotypes result in reluctance to
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in fact a relationship between age and ability to perform a job; 36
and (4) as a result of protectionist policies and programs such as
seniority systems, pensions, and insurance programs." The Labor
Secretary concluded that only arbitrary age discrimination resembled some forms of race discrimination." The Labor Secretary
specifically discounted the existence of significant age discrimination arising out of dislike or intolerance of older workers, noting
that discrimination against older workers generally takes the
form of employment decisions based on stereotypes about older
workers rather than animus toward the elderly.39
D. Both Moral and Economic Imperatives Underlie AntiDiscriminationPrinciples
The dissimilarities between race and age are further reflected
in differences in the moral force given the underlying rationales
that justify application of the anti-discrimination principles. In
the race context, the application of the anti-discrimination principle is justified because race discrimination is considered immoral4 ° and inefficient.4 1 The prohibition against race discrimina-

train older workers).
36. The Older American Worker, supra note 29, at 2.
A third type of discrimination-which should perhaps be called something
else entirely-involves decisions not to employ a person for a particular job
because of his age when there is in fact a relationshipbetween his age and his

ability to perform the job. The only reason for marking out this third area is
that it clearly does exist so far as the age question is concerned, but does not
exist so far as, for example, racial or religious discrimination are concerned.
Id.
37.

See id.

38. Id. at 5. The Secretary identified "arbitrary discrimination" as a significant adverse factor in the employment of older workers and that this waste of a valuable human
resource has a negative impact on the economy. Id. at 6-9. "There is, nevertheless, clear
evidence of the Nation's waste today of a wealth of human resources that could be contributed by hundreds of thousands of older workers, and of the needless denial to these workers of opportunity for that useful activity which constitutes much of life's meaning." Id. at
5.
39. Id. at 5-6. Congress seemed to accept the validity of the Secretary's conclusions.
In its statement of findings and purposes, Congress focused on the statute's goal of eliminating arbitrary discrimination: "It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to promote
employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary
age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting
problems arising from the impact of age on employment." 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2000).
40. This moral principle attracts widespread acceptance even among conservative
theorists.
41. Conservative theorists like Richard Epstein and Richard Posner argue that employment regulations impede inefficiency.
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tion in employment is justified because treating a worker differently because of his/her race is immoral. This moral principle is
one of the driving forces behind anti-racism and attracts widespread acceptance even among conservative theorists. This prohibition against age discrimination, on the other hand, does not
elicit the same universal agreement that age distinctions are immoral.4 2 General economic principles support the general proposition that treating workers based on individual ability promotes
efficiency. Employers do not have perfect information about an
individual worker and an employer's attempt to acquire such individual information can be costly. Therefore, many employers
resort to the use of proxies such as race or age as a substitute for
a work-related criteria, such as education level or dexterity. Economic theorists distinguish between this "rational" discrimination, which some argue can be "efficient" and "irrational" discrimination, which can impede efficiency.4 3 But, even "rational"
race discrimination is problematic for policy reasons. Economic
arguments in favor of "rational" age discrimination are more
widely accepted.
1. Anti-Racism-A Moral Imperative
The civil rights jurisprudence that underlies Title VII relies
heavily on "rights" theory-that some rights are so fundamental
from a moral standpoint that they deserve legal protection and,
in some circumstances, are so important that they trump any
countervailing concerns." The rights-based justification for anti-

42. See, e.g., Edward P. Lazear, Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?, 39 J. POL.
ECON. 127-36 (1979) (arguing that the ADEA may impair market efficiency). But cf
David Neumark & Wendy A. Stock, Age DiscriminationLaw and Labor Market Efficiency,
5 J. POL. ECON. 1081-1125 (1999).
43. Professor Richard Epstein, for example, vehemently criticizes anti-discrimination
laws as unnecessary impediments to market efficiency. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992) (arguing that discriminators are at a competitive disadvantage and that most discrimination
would not survive a competitive market).
44. There are a variety of "rights" theories, including natural rights and social contract theory. For a discussion of natural rights theory, see ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) and JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS (1990).
For a discussion of social contract theory, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
Several scholars question the "rights" theories. E.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board
of Education and the Interest-ConvergenceDilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980) (arguing
that rights are only granted to oppressed groups when it is in the majority's interest, not
because they are morally required); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through AntidiscriminationLaw: A CriticalReview of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62
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discrimination law is not as widely accepted under the ADEA.45
This fundamental difference is reflected in constitutional equal
protection jurisprudence.
Equal Protection jurisprudence has long ascribed different levels of scrutiny for classifications that affect a fundamental right4 6
or suspect class. A suspect class is one "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." 47 The suspect class designation is sparingly applied and generally reserved for "discrete and insular"
minorities. The nation's unfortunate history of race discrimination qualifies racial minorities as suspect classes. For that reason, racial classifications are subjected to the highest level of
scrutiny-strict scrutiny.4 8
Only classifications that are "like race" are accorded heightened scrutiny under the Constitution.4 9 Classifications based on
sex are subject to intermediate scrutiny to acknowledge the nation's history of gender discrimination. Age classifications, however, are subject to the lowest standard of constitutional scru-

MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1363,
1384-94 (1982) (critiquing rights discourse as lacking utility).
45. See Christine Jolls, Hands-Tying and the Age Discriminationin Employment Act,
74 TEx. L. REV. 1813, 1813-14 (1996).
46. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (applying strict scrutiny to the right of
privacy); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (recognizing a rational basis for the right
to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (recognizing rational basis for the right
of interstate travel); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (mandating strict scrutiny for
rights guaranteed by First Amendment); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (applying strict scrutiny for the right to procreate).
47. San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
48. In United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), the Supreme Court
stated that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities and... call for a more searching judicial inquiry." Id. at
153 n.4. The Court discusses the standard ofjudicial scrutiny of legislative enactments in
Carolene Products. Id. While the regulation at issue in Carolene Products was subject to
mere rational basis scrutiny, in footnote 4 the Court raised the prospect that racial classifications might be subject to a higher level of scrutiny. Id. The Supreme Court discussed
extensively the concept of suspect classifications in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944). Although the Court upheld the "relocation" of Japanese Americans, the Court
recognized "that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group
are immediately suspect" and "that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny."
Id. at 216.
49.

See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

149 (1980) ("[Olnly those classifications that are 'like race' in some relevant sense can responsibly be accorded similar treatment.").
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tiny-rational basis. Age classification need only serve a rational
government interest in order to be immune from constitutional
challenge.5" Older workers are neither "discrete and insular," nor,
according to the Supreme Court, a group in need of "extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."5 Instead, old age marks "a stage that each of us will reach if we live
out a normal span."52 Where an age classification is at issue,
courts defer to the judgment of the decision maker as long as the
classification serves some rational purpose.
In many respects the theoretical underpinnings of antidiscrimination law rely on the constitutional model of equal protection jurisprudence. While the rationales that underlie the prohibitions against race discrimination complement equal protection jurisprudence, the prohibition against age discrimination in
employment does not have the same symbiotic relations with constitutional jurisprudence. Yet, the statutory prohibition against
age discrimination as reflected in federal employment laws relies
on its close association with race discrimination for its moral
force.
While equal protection jurisprudence subjects age classifications to the lowest level of constitutional scrutiny, rational basis,
the ADEA lifts older workers to a protected class, potentially on
par with workers of color. The debates leading up to the passage
of the ADEA focused on the history of unequal treatment of older
workers.5 3 Moreover, the ADEA liberally invokes Title VII's antidiscrimination mantel in support of its passage and adopts Title
VII's anti-discrimination language virtually word for word.
It is in the application of the ADEA that the reliance on the
race model raises problems. The differences between the pro-

50. For a further discussion of suspect classifications, see id. at 145-70.
51. Massachusetts Bd.of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (quoting Rodriguez,
411 U.S. at 28). In Murgia, the Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs' argument that age classifications deserved heightened constitutional scrutiny:
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been wholly free of
discrimination, such persons, unlike, say, those who have been discriminated
against on the basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a "history
of purposeful unequal treatment" or been subjected to unique disabilities on
the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities.

Id. at 313.
52. Id. "Even if the statute could be said to impose a penalty upon a class defined as
the aged, it would not impose a distinction sufficiently akin to those classifications that we
have found suspect to call for strict scrutiny." Id.
53. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
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tected group of black workers versus the protected group of older
workers, many of which are recognized in equal protection jurisprudence but ignored by anti-discrimination statutes, create inevitable tensions in the law as applied in age discrimination
cases.
2. Anti-Racism-An Economic Imperative
Anti-discrimination principles are also justified based on efficiency concerns.54 Two arguments underlie the prohibition
against race discrimination--either laws prohibiting race discrimination are efficient or, if not efficient, nevertheless necessary for overriding policy reasons. First, making employment decisions based on "distaste" for workers of color results in an
underutilization of human capital. Second, even if antidiscrimination laws can lead to inefficiencies, these inefficiencies
are outweighed by general social benefit of anti-discrimination. In
age cases, on the other hand, such laws are frequently attacked
as promoting economic inefficiency by interfering with the employer's ability to discharge older workers.
Some economists argue that discrimination is only problematic
to the extent that it causes market inefficiencies.5 5 These theorists distinguish "irrational" from "rational" discrimination. "Irrational" discrimination is discrimination without any attendant
social benefit. Discrimination based on animus toward a protected group, for example, has little social benefit, even if it
brings pleasure to the individual who discriminated. "Rational"
discrimination creates a more complex problem. If the employer
is acting rationally, then legal impediments to employer decisionmaking may, indeed, encourage inefficiencies.

54. For a more thorough discussion of economic theories of discrimination, see generally GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971); RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS

(1992); John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1411 (1986); Edmund
S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659 (1972).
55. Richard Epstein argues that the anti-discrimination regulations themselves create inefficiencies, such that, if left to market forces, discrimination would either disappear
altogether or at least be rendered harmless. EPSTEIN, supra note 58. Epstein's provocative
theory has generated a great deal of criticism. Professor Donohue, for example, argues
that Title VII is efficient. See Donohue, supra note 58, at 1425-31; see also Paulette M.
Caldwell, Reaffirming the DisproportionateEffects Standard of Liability in Title VII Litigation, 46 U. PITT.L. REV. 555 (1985).
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As this theory goes, a "rational" employer will discriminate
where the protected characteristic is a useful proxy 6 for job qualifications. Employers often resort to proxies where precise information is costly to obtain. In theory, reliance on a proxy may be
appropriate where it is not a cover for bias toward workers but is
based on purely economic considerations, such as costs. 7 For example, because "[s]eniority and longevity often influence salary
and fringe benefit levels" and "[biecause these factors correlate
with age" some employers argue that discriminating against cost8 As this theory goes, employers
lier older workers is "rational.""
are reluctant to hire older workers, not because of assumptions or
misapprehensions about the workers' ability, but because, in general, they cost more.
The second part of the "rational" discrimination argument posits that, even if the employer makes ageist decisions based on
stereotypes, because the stereotypes are not necessarily inaccurate such actions should not trigger legal protection for the older
worker. Sometimes the stereotypes are accurate. There may in
fact be a relationship between age and ability to perform a specific job. Because the rate of this decline varies from individual to
individual, the role of the law is to prevent employers from generalizing about an older worker's abilities by insisting that,
wherever possible, an employer must make an individualized determination of a particular employee's fitness to perform the specific job at issue. 9 But where such a correlation can be shown, the
employer may discriminate.
Reliance on proxies to justify discrimination is much more controversial in the race context. With respect to race, while there
may be demonstrable statistical discrepancies in work characteristics based on race, such as education level achieved, the idea of
any correlation between race and inherent physical or mental

56. For employment purposes, a proxy is where the employer uses a protected characteristic as a substitute for another trait. For example, an employer uses age as a proxy for
manual dexterity.
57. Hall & Mirvis, supra note 36, at 78-79 (discussing the cost barrier to employment
of older workers); see David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination
in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEo. L.J. 1619, 1639-43 (1991)
(arguing that statistical discrimination can persist if there are actual differences in productivity between groups but should not persist if there are no actual differences in productivity).
58. Stevan J. Kaminshine, The Cost of Older Workers, DisparateImpact, and the Age
Discriminationin Employment Act, 42 FLA. L. REV. 229, 232 (1990).
59. See Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 421-22 (1985).
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ability is summarily rejected.6 ° Rather, racial disparities seen in
job-related "abilities" are generally traced to a legacy of segregation and subordination.6" Thus, reliance on race as a proxy for job
characteristics, even if fairly accurate, is nevertheless morally
troubling because it tends to perpetuate the social realities that
make the predictions accurate.6 2
Case law reflects this tension. Age proxy theory has developed
somewhat differently than race proxy theory. The case law presents a confusing development of proxy theory in age cases. Initially, most courts treated age proxy as they did race proxy-that
some proxies are so closely related to age that an employer's reliance on them constitutes per se age discrimination.6 3 Other
courts such as the Supreme Court in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,6 4 held that reliance on a trait correlated with age might be
evidence of intentional discrimination, but not of age discrimination per se. 6' The Court in Biggins concluded that the ADEA is
not violated where the employer acts "because of' some feature
other than age, even if that feature (such as pension vesting)

60. E.g., CLAUDE S. FISCHER ET AL., INEQUALITY BY DESIGN: CRACKING THE BELL
CURVE MYTH (1996); INTELLIGENCE, GENES, AND SUCCESS: SCIENTISTS RESPOND TO THE
BELL CURVE (Bernie Devlin et al. eds., 1997); MEASURED LIES: THE BELL CURVE
EXAMINED (Joe L. Kincheloe et al. eds., 1996); THE BELL CURVE DEBATE: HISTORY,
DOCUMENTS, OPINIONS (Russell Jacoby & Naomi Glauberman eds., 1995); THE BELL
CURVE WARS: RACE, INTELLIGENCE AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA (Steven Fraser ed.,
1995).
61. Mary E. Becker, Needed in the Nineties: Improved Individual and Structural
Remedies for Racial and Sexual Disadvantagesin Employment, 79 GEO. L. J. 1659, 166770 (1991).
62. See Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful DiscriminationWrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 203-08 (1992). Professor Alexander argues in favor of a per se ban on the use of race proxies. Id. at 205. First, the use of
race as a rational proxy "may be extrinsically immoral because of the social effects of such
use." Id. Second, claimed uses of "rational" race proxy will often be a cover for an immoral
bias. Id. Third, even if the use of race as a proxy is not immoral, forbidding its use in employment is "unlikely to infringe the employers' moral rights." Id. Fourth, a per se ban on
the use of race proxy may be easier to administer rather than having to adjudicate its use
on a case-by-case basis. Id. Because the line between the moral rights of discriminators
and victims is often difficult to draw, Professor Alexander argues that the law should not
concern itself with all possible violations of moral rights, but only prohibit those types of
discrimination that are most likely to be immoral, meaning most likely to violate the victim's rights or to cause the most social harm. Id. He argues that race discrimination is
most likely to be immoral. This is less true for age discrimination. Id. at 204.
63. See Robert J. Gregory, There Is Life in That Old (I Mean, More "Senior")Dog Yet:
The Age-Proxy Theory After Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 391, 393-94
(1994) (arguing that a limited proxy theory survives Biggins).
64. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
65. Id. at 613.
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closely correlates with age.66 The Court used the unique history of
the ADEA to support its interpretation.6 7 The Court did not address how Biggins should be used in race cases, but made clear
that in age cases an employer is not forbidden to rely on factors
closely correlated with age. 68
Principles of analogous legal reasoning encourage treating age
discrimination as more "like" race than different from race. The
rationales that lend force to anti-racist principles do not necessarily lend the same force to ageist decisions.

III. THE RACE-BASED ANTI-DISCRIMINATION MODEL
The anti-discrimination model that arose out of the civil rights
movement was designed primarily to address race discrimination
in private and public life. Activists sought to reverse centuries of
formal and informal subordination of African Americans through
application of anti-discrimination principles, both under the Constitution and as codified in civil rights statutes.
The employment discrimination that was prevalent and legal
for much of this nation's history represented a formidable threat
to the livelihood of all who suffered under it. 69 Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 deals specifically with discrimination in
employment and prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.7" Section 703 provides:

66. Id. at 616. Professor Gregory argues that while the Court in Biggins rejected the
broadest version of proxy theory, it did not preclude the possibility of using proxy theory
as evidence of intentional discrimination. See Gregory, supra note 49, at 393-94.
67. Biggins, 507 U.S. at 614.
68. Id. at 616.
69. In 1965, a non-white man must have had between one to three years of college before he could expect to earn as much as a white man with less than eight years of schooling. Andrew F. Brimmer, The Negro in the National Economy, in THE AMERICAN NEGRO
REFERENCE BOOK 260 (John P. Davis ed., 1966). In 1959 black workers earned $612 for
every $1,000 for whites. ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE,
HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 101 (1992). Between 1947 and 1964 the median income of non-white
families was less than three-fifths of white families. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE NEGROES
IN THE U.S.: THEIR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SITUATION, BULL. No. 1511, at 13 (1966). Between 1954 and 1968 the unemployment rate for non-whites was more than double the
rate for whites. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, Manpower Report of the President, 237 (1968);
ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 255 (1969).
70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) to 2000e-2(n) (2000).
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It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employeebecause of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.

Although Title VII protects against discrimination on the basis
of religion, sex, or national origin,72 the primary concern was
America's race problem 7 3-specifically the conditions of African
Americans.7 4

71.

Id. § 2000e-2(a).

72.

While the history leading up to the bill's passage was focused on race relations, as

a result of a series of compromises and other maneuvers, the text of the civil rights bill
was not limited to ending race discrimination, but included discrimination on the basis of
color, creed, national origin, and sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). An opponent hoping to derail
the entire bill apparently added "sex" to the employment provision of the bill. See
CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE 1964 CrvIL RIGHTS ACT 115-16 (1985). But there was very little public debate
about the type, degree, or frequency of discrimination faced by these additional groups. Id.
at 117. As each of these groups rightfully demanded protection under the statute, they
framed their claims in terms of their similarity to race plaintiffs.
73. In his speech to the nation before introducing the bill in Congress, President Kennedy made specific reference to the goal as eliminating inequalities based on race:
One hundred years of delay have passed since President Lincoln freed the
slaves, yet their heirs, their grandsons, are not fully free. They are not yet
freed from the bonds of injustice. They are not yet freed from social and economic oppression. And this Nation, for all its hopes and all its boasts, will not
be fully free until all its citizens are free.
WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 72, at xx.
Attorney General Robert Kennedy emphasized the Act's racial purpose in his testimony
at the first hearing of the bill before the House Judiciary Committee:
With respect to the bill [H.R. 7152] in its entirety, it must be emphasized that
racial discrimination has been with us since long before the United States became a nation, and we cannot expect it to vanish through the enactment of
laws alone. But we must launch as broad an attack as possible.
Id. at5.
President Lyndon Johnson emphasized the goal of the law, to eliminate racial inequalities, in his televised speech to the nation before signing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into
law.
I am about to sign into law the Civil Rights Act of 1964. I want to take this
occasion to talk to you about what the law means to every American. We believe that all men are created equal. Yet many are denied equal treatment.
We believe that all men have certain inalienable rights. Yet many Americans
do not enjoy these rights. We believe that all men are entitled to the blessings
of liberty. Yet millions are being deprived of those blessings-not because of
their own failures, but because of the color of their skin....
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The Civil Rights Act of 1964 came about as the result of protests against racial segregation.7 5 The racialization of American
society into black/white resulted in the legal, cultural, and geographic separation of the races. The legal separation of the races
continued well past the formal abolition of slavery.7 6 The Jim
Crow laws in the South, for example, separated the races in
places of public accommodation. Many employers also adopted
formal segregationist policies. But by the 1960s a well-organized
campaign to end formal racial segregation swept the country.77
Civil rights leaders carried on a multi-pronged battle against segregation. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People challenged segregation in the courts.7" Civil rights
organizations, such as the Student Non-Violent Coordinating
Committee, Congress on Racial Equality, the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference, and others took their protests to the
streets, bringing their fight directly into American homes via
television. 79 The violent response to peaceful protests focused the
national spotlight on the condition and treatment of African
Americans. The response of Birmingham Chief of Police, Bull
Connor, to the peaceful protests by school children-turning water hoses and police dogs on them-was broadcast both nationally

Id. at 227.
74. Anti-discrimination law is often viewed as representing a black/white racial paradigm that does not fully address the realities of non-black people of color. For a critique of
the limits of the black/white racial paradigm, see, for example, ROBERT S. CHANG,
DISORIENTED: ASIAN AMERICANS, LAW, AND THE NATION-STATE 58-60 (1999); Grillo &

Wildman, supra note 14, at 401-10.
75. The anti-discrimination laws that made up the Civil Rights Act of 1964 sought to
appease those protesting the systemic racial inequities that existed in American society.
No longer just content with nonviolent protests and no longer confined to the South, urban
violence protesting racism and segregation spread throughout the country. The National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders reported 8 major uprisings, 33 serious uprisings,
and 123 minor incidents. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders
65-66 (1968).
76. American racism is rooted in an American history symbolized by slavery, an institution aptly described as evil. The "peculiar" American institution of slavery was justified
on the twin beliefs of the racial inferiority of African Americans and biological determinism. See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A
HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 122, 189 (7th ed. 1994); George W. Ellis, The Psychology
of American Race Prejudice, in RACISM: ESSENTIAL READINGS 10 (Ellis Cashmore & James
Jennings eds., 2001) (describing racism as based on a belief that blacks are naturally inferior to whites and a system of social, economic, and political benefits for whites at the expense of blacks).
77. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 484 (1954) (ending racial
segregation in schools).
79. See, e.g., HOWARD ZINN, SNCC: THE NEw ABOLITIONISTS (1964).
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(and internationally) and further mobilized support for an end to
segregation. 0 An increasing number of Americans of all races
took part in the protests.81 The escalating violence and tension
brought increasing public pressure for action to bear on the
President and Congress to act.8 2
Years of protest, civil disobedience, sustained, organized, and
unrelenting challenge to the evil of segregation culminated in the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,83 which passed with popular support. With the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Congress left many unanswered questions. Congress failed to define "discrimination" in the statute, for example. It was left to the
courts to determine the parameters for liability, in other words,
to define which employer actions violated the statutes.
A. Liability Theories Expanded To Strike at the Full Spectrum of
Race Discrimination
Early cases applying anti-discrimination principles in employment were focused on race, eliminating race discrimination in
employment.' It was in these early cases that the major compo-

80. Hundreds of demonstrations and thousands of arrests took place in the weeks following the children's campaign. See WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 72, at 19 ("In the 10
weeks following the children's march in Birmingham, there were 758 demonstrations,
with 13,786 people arrested in 75 cities in the South alone.").
81. See id. ("A July Newsweek poll revealed that forty percent of black people had
taken part in a sit-in, marched in a mass protest, or picketed a store.").
82. See id. at 33-34. Examples of the escalating violence include the murder of civil
rights activist Medgar Evers and the bomb that exploded under the steps of the Sixteenth
Street Baptist Church in Birmingham, Alabama, killing four little girls. Id.
83. For a description of the events leading up to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, see generally Robert D. Loevy, Introduction: The Background of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, in THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW THAT ENDED RACIAL

SEGREGATION 10-42 (Robert D. Loevy ed., 1997). For a description of the legal history of
the civil rights movement, see LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH
CENTURY 297-311 (2002); ZINN, supra note 79. For a first person account of the strategy
and tactics employed to get the bill passed over resistance, see Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., The
Role of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights in the Civil Rights Struggle of 1963-64,
in

THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW THAT ENDED RACIAL

SEGREGATION (Robert D. Loevy ed., 1997).
84. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the first Supreme Court case
interpreting the substantive provisions of Title VII, the Court held that high school diploma and intelligence test requirements that had a disparate impact on African American workers violated Title VII. See id. at 431-32. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Court permitted the plaintiff to proceed with his cause of action
for intentional discrimination without direct evidence of the employer's discriminatory
motive. See id. at 798-804.
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nents of anti-discrimination law were developed, including formulating the first definition of "discrimination," 5 developing the
theories of liability; 6 and laying out the structures of proof plaintiffs must follow in establishing liability." These early decisions
establishing liability theories and altering proof structures were
built upon fundamental assumptions about the nature of race
discrimination in America-that race discrimination in employment was rampant, it was hard to prove, and that past discrimination contributed to the poor social conditions of African Americans. These assumptions were reflected in the expansion of
liability theory to include unintentional employer acts, the lowering of the standard of proof in intentional discrimination cases,
and the development of a theory of affirmative action to mitigate
the present effects of past discrimination.
1. A Lower Standard of Proof of Intent
Traditional anti-discrimination law forbade intentional race
discrimination. In intentional discrimination cases (disparate
treatment cases), the plaintiff must prove that the employer
treated him or her less favorably than others because of his or
her protected characteristic, such as race. 8 Proof of the employer's motive is crucial to proving discrimination in these
9
cases.8

Early Title VII courts adopted a special proof structure for
proving intent. The special proof structure permits plaintiffs to
take advantage of relaxed pleading standards and favorable inferences. The special proof structure acknowledged that victims of
race discrimination are unlikely to have direct evidence of discrimination (e.g., a supervisor who says, "you're fired because
you're black") and recognizes the difficulty of proving intent using
circumstantial evidence. The Supreme Court adopted a special
proof structure that applies to circumstantial evidence cases. The
employee can create a legally rebuttable presumption of inten85. There was some debate whether "discrimination" focused on employer intent or
effect of employer actions. See, e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 668-69
(1987); Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 58-61 (1st Cir. 1999); Ferrill v.
Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 472-73 (11th Cir. 1999).
86. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977).
87. See infra notes 90-99 and accompanying text.
88. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
89. Id.
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tional discrimination merely by proving a bare minimum of
facts-the employee's race and that he or she was imminently
qualified for a job but was passed over. The special proof structure permits plaintiffs to take advantage of relaxed pleading
standards and favorable inferences.9" Specifically, in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green,9 the Court adopted a special proof structure for intentional discrimination cases based on circumstantial
evidence.92 The plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating that the plaintiff belongs to a protected group, that the plaintiff applied for and was qualified for
the job, and despite his/her qualifications, the plaintiff was rejected, and after his/her rejection the position remained open.9 3
Under this special proof structure, proving the prima facie
elements results in "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" in favor of the plaintiff.94 The burden then shifts "to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the employee's rejection."95 Finally, the plaintiff must be given an
opportunity to show that the employer's stated reason is mere
pretext.9 6 The inference of intent from proof of the prima facie
factors reflects a judgment that acts, not otherwise explained by
common non-discriminatory reasons-such as the employee was
unqualified or failed to apply for the job-more likely were the
result of discrimination.9 7 As the Supreme Court explained in
Furnco ConstructionCorp. v. Waters:9

90. See infra note 114-19 and accompanying text.
91. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
92. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358 n.44 (1977).
93. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (1973).
94. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.7 (1981).
95. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
96. See id. at 804. The Supreme Court also adopted a special proof structure for proving systemic discrimination against a class of plaintiffs. In InternationalBrotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), the Supreme Court held that Title VII
plaintiffs can make out a systemic disparate treatment case using circumstantial evidence
by establishing that the employer has engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination.
See id. at 334-43. Like in individual disparate treatment cases, proof of the prima facie
elements results in a presumption in favor of the plaintiffs. See id. at 342-43. In these
cases the employer's discriminatory motive can be inferred from statistical disparities as
well as anecdotal evidence of disparate treatment of individual class members. See id. at
337-40. Like in individual cases, once a plaintiff satisfies the prima facie case, the employer has an opportunity to rebut. See id. at 342.
97. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 n.7.
98. 438 U.S. 567 (1978). In Furnco, three African American bricklayers made out a
prima facie case of discrimination against their employer for the employer's refusal to hire
them. Id. at 569. The employer, accused by these bricklayers of discrimination, "hired only
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A prima facie case ...raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more
likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors.
And we are willing to presume this largely because we know from
our experience that more often than not people do not act in a totally
arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a
business setting. Thus,... it is more likely than not the employer,
who we generally assume acts only with some reason, based his deci99
sion on an impermissible consideration such as race.

Similarly, the Supreme Court's willingness to infer discrimina-

tory intent from the absence of workers of color in an employer's
workforce reflects an acceptance of fundamental assumptions
about the persistence of racial inequality. In InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,'° the government alleged
that the employer intentionally discriminated on the basis of race
in assigning drivers.1 ' In support of its argument the government offered evidence that African American and Latinos, who
represented a significant percentage of the community from
which the drivers were hired, were concentrated in the lower paying city driver positions and that none filled the line driver positions. 12 Although the employer did not have a formal policy of assigning jobs based on race, the Court relied on the stark absence
of Latinos and African Americans in the line driver position to infer intent.0 3 The Court concluded that "[s]tatistics showing racial
or ethnic imbalance are probative in a case such as this one only
because such imbalance is often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination.""° Rather than forcing each individual plaintiff to
prove the employer intended to discriminate against him or her
individually, the Court accepted the idea that the absence of diversity is the equivalent of circumstantial evidence of intent and
that non-discriminatory employment practices should result in a

persons whom he knew to be experienced and competent... [bricklayers] or persons who
had been recommended to him as similarly skilled." Id. at 570. The court of appeals reversed the district court ruling that the plaintiffs failed to make out a prima facie case of
intentional discrimination. Id. at 569. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
case. Id. The Court agreed that the company had effectively rebutted plaintiffs' prima facie case of intentional discrimination. Id. at 578. But, the Court concluded, a prima facie
showing establishes merely a rebuttable presumption; it is not equivalent to an ultimate
finding of discrimination. Id. at 576-77.
99. Id. at 577 (citation omitted).
100. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
101. Id. at 329.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 342 n.23.
104. Id. at 340 n.20.
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racially diverse workforce; therefore, it is unlikely that a racially
segregated workforce would arise by chance."°5 In both McDonnell
Douglas and Teamsters, the Supreme Court made clear that a
wide range of circumstantial evidence can support a finding of intent to discriminate.
2. Mitigating the Effects of Past Discrimination
The Supreme Court was also concerned with the present effects of past racial discrimination. It was in this context that the
Court designed theories to mitigate the effects of past discrimination. The Court developed the theory of disparate impact to attack neutral employer policies that perpetuated the effects of past
racial discrimination. 1 6 The Court also approved the employers'
voluntary use of affirmative action to address persistent racial
inequities. In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,10 7 a white
employee challenged the validity of an affirmative action plan
adopted as part of a collective bargaining agreement.'
The plan
was "designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalances in...
[the employer's] then almost exclusively white craftwork force."'0 9
The plan reserved 50% of the openings in in-plant craft-training
programs for black employees.' The plan was to continue until
the percentage of black craft workers in a plant was commensurate with the percentage of blacks in the local labor force."' The
Court held that Title VII did not forbid all forms of private, voluntary affirmative action." 2
It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern
over centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of
those who had 'been excluded from the American dream for so long,'
constituted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private,
race-conscious efforts 11to3 abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy.

105. See id. at 339-40 & n.20.
106. See infra notes 115-121 and accompanying text.
107. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
108. Id. at 198-99.
109. Id. at 198.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 199.
112. Id. at 208.
113. Id. at 204 (citation omitted) (quoting Sen. Humphrey, 110 Cong. Rec. 6552 (1964)).
The recent decision by the Supreme Court in Grutter v. Bollinger reaffirmed the use of
affirmative action in school admissions. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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The Court looked to the legislative history of Title VII as well as
to the goals of the statute to support its ruling." 4
3. Disparate Impact: Liability for Unintentional Discrimination
Supporters of the new civil rights laws sought to expand the
scope of liability to include liability for unintentionally discriminatory acts as well. Eventually, this is where constitutional doctrine and statutory doctrine diverged. Civil rights activists were
unsuccessful in their attempts to incorporate liability for unintentional acts into equal protection jurisprudence." 5 Under federal employment laws, however, both liability theories were recognized. Employers could be liable for both intentional and
unintentional acts.'1 6
In these disparate impact cases, intent is not the basis of liability. The challenge is to an employment practice that is facially
neutral in its treatment of a protected group but falls more
harshly on a protected group and cannot be justified by business
necessity. Of course, recognizing liability for unintentional acts
does not result in automatic employer liability for every policy
that impacts racial groups differently. It is only for those disparate impacts for which the employer is unable to demonstrate a
business justification.
Disparate impact theory was not explicitly provided for in the
original version of Title VII, but implied from the statutory language and history. The justification for extending employment
laws to include this theory rested primarily on concerns about the
invidious nature of race discrimination in employment. The Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co."' inferred disparate
impact from the statutory language of Title VII. In Griggs, a
group of African American workers challenged an employer policy
requiring employees to have a high school diploma and to pass a
general intelligence test in order to transfer to other jobs within

114. Weber, 443 U.S. at 201-07.
115. In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the Supreme Court rejected application of disparate impact theory under the Constitution. See id. at 244-48.
116. These two theories of liability became known as disparate treatment theory referring to intentionally discriminatory acts and disparate impact theory referring to unintentionally discriminatory acts.
117. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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the company."' The Court concluded that Title VII prohibited unintentional discrimination as well as intentional discrimination." 9 The goal of the statute, according to the Court, was to
"achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group
of white employees over other employees." 2 ° Under this standard,
"practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even
neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate
to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices."' 2 ' The Griggs Court looked to the goals of Title VII and
determined that the goal of equal opportunity meant more than
eliminating overt discrimination, but included the removal of institutional barriers that continued to operate to the disadvantage
of black workers. These early cases demonstrate the Court's belief
in the pervasiveness of race discrimination and its commitment
to interpret Title VII to address both overt and subtle forms of
discrimination.
B. CombatingRacism By Limiting Employer Defenses to
Discrimination
The limited defenses available to employers in discrimination
cases also demonstrate concern with the pervasiveness of race
discrimination. Defenses to race discrimination include a combination of statutory and common law defenses.' 2 2 Only two of Title
VII's statutory defenses make direct reference to race-defenses
based on application of a bona fide seniority or merit system 23 or
use of professionally developed tests.'24 Further, the few defenses

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 426-28.
Id. at 429-30.
Id.
Id. at 430.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)(2000).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) provides:
[I]t
shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply
different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a
system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or to
employees who work in different locations, provided that such differences are
not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion,
sex or national origin ....
124. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) further provides:
[Nior shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give
and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test pro-
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that are recognized are interpreted narrowly, and courts limit the
types of rationales employers can present in defense to race discrimination.' 2 5 Although it incorporates a "bona fide occupational
defense," which allows the employer to defend an otherwise discriminatory decision if it can show the discriminatory act is supported by a bona fide business reason.
Section 703e(1) of Title VII provides a statutory defense to discrimination on the basis of religion,'2 6 sex, 127 and national origin
where the employer can show that absence of the protected characteristic is a bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ") for
the job. It states:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
hire and employ employees .... on the basis of his religion, sex, or
national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise .... 128

The BFOQ defense does not apply to race discrimination, however. In effect, Congress made a legislative determination that
race is never a "bona fide occupational qualification" for employment. 2 9 By excluding the BFOQ defense in race cases, Congress

vided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or
national origin.
125. See, e.g., Ferrill v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 473 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding
the bona fide occupational defense inapplicable to race discrimination).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) states, "[tihe term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious
observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business."
127. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) provides:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for
any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the
amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such
employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of Section
206(d) of title 29.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1). According to the Interpretive Memo that accompanied
Title VII, "examples of such legitimate discrimination would be the preference of a French
restaurant for a French cook, the preference of a professional baseball team for male players, and the preference of a business which seeks the patronage of members of particular
religious groups for a salesman of that religion." 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964) (Interpretive
Memorandum of Title VII of H.R. 7152 Submitted Jointly by Senator Joseph S. Clark and
Senator Clifford P. Case, Floor Managers).
129. One explanation of the lack of a race BFOQ is that Congress recognized that race
discrimination is more harmful than discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, or national origin. Another explanation is that Congress believed (perhaps mistakenly) that a
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cemented the statute's focus on race as its primary concern. In
addition to the statutory defenses, the courts have inferred additional common law defenses to discrimination cases. An employer
can rebut an inference of discriminatory motive by showing that
the employer
had a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its
130
decision.
Defenses to race are interpreted narrowly. Early cases placed
the burden on the employer to prove it acted pursuant to a legitimate non-discriminatory reason to avoid liability." ' Later
cases somewhat loosened the strictures on an employer's ability
to defend against discrimination cases. In Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine,'32 the Court held that the employer need only offer evidence of a legitimate reason for its actions, rather than prove it acted pursuant to that legitimate reason.' 33 Later cases greatly expanded the types of reasons an
employer can offer in defense of its actions. The scope of "legitimate" reasons seems to include any reason that does not expressly violate the anti-discrimination principle even if it violates
some other of the employer's legal obligations. 3 4
The business necessity defense is available to the employer in
unintentional discrimination cases. In unintentional discrimination cases the employer can prevail if it shows that the employ-

race BFOQ was unnecessary because certain types of benign race discrimination did not
rise to the level of a Title VII violation. For example, Senators Clark and Case in their interpretive memorandum to Title VII acknowledged that Title VII did not prohibit directors
from discriminating on the basis of physical appearance. They used the example of casting
a film in Africa for the proposition that the director could validly exclude those actors who
did not appear African. 110 CONG. REC. 7212, 7213 (1964).
130. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973). In offering its
legitimate non-discriminatory reason, the employer is held to a lower proof standard-a
burden of production rather than a burden of persuasion. See id. The burden that shifts to
the employer is to rebut the presumption of discrimination established by proof of the
prima facie case. See id. The employer need not persuade the factfinder that it was actually motivated by the proffered reason; the employer need only raise a genuine issue of
fact by introducing admissible evidence of the reason for the adverse action. Texas Dep't of
Cnty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981).
131. See, e.g., Burdine v. Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs, 608 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1979),
overruled by 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Williams v. Bell, 87 F.2d 1240, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
Higgins v. Gates Rubber Co., 578 F.2d 281, 284 (10th Cir. 1978).
132. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
133. Id. at 255-58 (holding that the employer has a mere burden of production rather
than a burden of persuasion with respect to the "legitimate non-discriminatory reason"
defense).
134. Indeed, in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, the Court upheld as legitimate an employer's admission that it intended to violate ERISA as a "legitimate non-discriminatory
reason" for age discrimination. 507 U.S. at 612.
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ment criteria that caused the under representation was "jobrelated" and consistent with a "business necessity." In general,
the business necessity defense has been interpreted narrowly, in
part, no doubt, as a result of135the judicial acceptance of the prevalence of race discrimination.
The courts further limit the types of rationales employers can
present in defense to race discrimination. Early on courts rejected
the idea of costs as a justification for race discrimination. In early
Title VII cases, for example, employers argued that integrated
workforces would harm the employer's bottom line, either because customers would boycott such establishments or integration would increase firm governance costs because of coworker
animosity. In Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.,'36 the Fourth Circuit
rejected the employer's business necessity defense that was based
on a cost rationale: "[Alvoidance of the expense of changing employment practices is not a business purpose that will validate
the racially differential effects of an otherwise unlawful employment practice."' 3 7 The societal goal of eliminating race discrimination outweighed concerns about the additional costs an employer must absorb in order to further that goal.
While the Supreme Court has never specifically addressed the
cost justification defense in a race case, the Court nevertheless
made its view of cost justifications under Title VII clear in Los
Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart,13' a sex discrimination case. In Manhart, the employer required female employees to make larger contributions to the pension fund than
male employees.'3 9 The employer argued, based on evidence including mortality tables, that since women on average live longer
than men, the cost of a pension for the average retired female
would be greater than for the average male, and therefore female

135. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); see also supra text accompanying note 84.
136. 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971).
137. Id. at 800; see also United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 366 (8th Cir.
1973) ("[W]e do not believe that the alleged excessive costs in changing the seniority system can be substantiated. However, assuming arguendo that the proposed remedy will
entail some additional costs, we adhere to the Fourth Circuit's view that, '[Alvoidance of
the expense of changing employment practices is not a business purpose that will validate
the racially differential effects of an otherwise unlawful employment practice.'"). Id.
138. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
139. Id. at 705.
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employees were justifiably required to make higher contributions. 14 The Court rejected the employer's cost defense.
In essence, the Department is arguing that the prima facie showing
of discrimination based on evidence of different contributions for the
respective sexes is rebutted by its demonstration that there is a like
difference in the cost of providing benefits for the respective
classes.... But neither Congress
nor the courts have recognized
14 1
such a defense under Title VII.

Although Manhart is a sex discrimination case, the Court's broad
language rejecting the cost justification defense "under Title VII"
seems to preclude the cost justification rationale under any Title
VII category, including race, a view consistent with the treatment
of cost rationales in lower courts.
IV. THE AGE MODEL: IMPORTING FROM RACE
Take the sum of human achievement in action, in science, in art, in
literature; subtract the work of men above 40, and while we should
miss great treasures, even priceless treasures, we would practically
be where we are today. It is difficult to name a great and farreaching conquest of the mind which has not been given to the world
by a man on whose back the sun was still shining. The effective,
moving, vitalizing work of the world is done between the ages of 25
and 40.
-William Osler 1908142

Anti-discrimination principles rightly apply more broadly than
the limited context of race. The goal of eliminating inequities
based on gender, for example, has resulted in the wide application of these anti-discrimination principles in that context. Federal employment laws extend the anti-discrimination principle to
actions based on religion, national origin, age, and disability. But
the methodology of applying a race model to address discrimination against disparate social groups raises concerns. What adjustments if any should be added to the race model to accommodate these differences? What effect, if any, will this expansion
have on existing groups?

140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id. at 716-17.
William Osler, The Osler Deadline, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1908, at pt. 5, p. 11, in

KERRY SEGRAVE, AGE DISCRIMINATION BY EMPLOYERS 8 (2001).
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From the outset, ADEA proponents sought to import general
anti-discrimination standards into the ADEA-that is, to treat
older workers like black workers before the law. Consequently,
many of the formal legal standards adopted in the race context
under Title VII were transposed to the ADEA. The push to make
age plaintiffs "like race" plaintiffs went beyond emphasizing similarities in statutory language. Proponents focused on similarities
between the goals of the two statutes and similarities in the type
of discrimination the two groups have faced to advance the argument that age discrimination is analogous to race discrimination
and therefore age plaintiffs should have access to the full panoply
of discrimination theories. But, as discussed above, older workers
and black workers are dissimilar in several respects. Antidiscrimination law provides little or no guidance on how to incorporate the differences. Instead the case law is a study of confusion and incoherence. Courts sometimes ignore the dissimilarities
between the two groups and allow determinations about race uncritically to guide their interpretation of age discrimination. In
other situations courts take account of the dissimilarities and
these dissimilarities are reflected in the law as applied. These
courts tend to narrow anti-discrimination theories in age cases
and broaden defenses to age discrimination.
A. The Age Discriminationin Employment Act
The ADEA, which was passed three years after Title VII,
adopted many of the substantive provisions of Title VII.' 4 ' The
definition of an "unlawful employment practice" under the ADEA
is taken word for word from the Title VII definition of an unlawful employment practice, merely substituting the word "age" for
the phrase "race, color, sex, religion, sex, or national origin."'"

143. The ADEA borrowed many of the substantive provisions from Title VII, but it followed the model of the Federal Labor Standards Act in establishing its enforcement
mechanism. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584-85 (1978) (determining that Congress intended for the ADEA's remedial and procedural provisions to follow the Federal
Labor Standards Act, rather than Title VII).
144. Compare Title VII, § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2000), with ADEA, § 623, 29 U.S.C.
§ 623 (2000).

20041

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

Section 703 of Title VII provides:

Section 623 of the ADEA
provides:

It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer...-

It shall be [an] unlawful [employment practice] for an employer-

(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.145

(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or
otherwise
to
discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of
such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees [or applicants of employment] in any
way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because 6 of such individual's
14
age.

The similarity in language lent weight to the argument that
the ADEA should be interpreted similarly to Title VII.147 Yet, as
discussed in Part II.C.1. above differing constitutional standards
of review suggest a more complicated interpretation. This underlying disconnect between theory and application is seen in the refusal of many courts to recognize disparate impact theory in age

145. Sections 703(c)-(d), (k)-(m) of Title VII describes additional prohibitions on discrimination. Sections 703(e)-(j) describes exceptions to the anti-discrimination principle.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3.
146. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (emphasis added). Section 623(c)(1) of the ADEA describes additional prohibitions on age discrimination as well as exceptions to the prohibitions. See 29
U.S.C. § 623(c)(1).
147. See, for example, Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1984), where
the Supreme Court prohibited discrimination on the basis of age in the allocation of employment benefits as such action is prohibited under Title VII. "This interpretation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [requiring non-discrimination in dispensing of benefits]
applies with equal force in the context of age discrimination, for the substantive provisions
of the ADEA 'were derived in haec verba from Title VII.'"Id. at 121 (citation omitted)
(quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978)).
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discrimination cases in courts, refusal to permit "reverse" age
discrimination cases, 48 and in the inconsistent application of relaxed pleading standards in age cases. The manner in which
these liability theories and proof structures are applied in age
cases suggests that at some level courts recognize that the same
assumptions do not operate in the age context as they do in the
race context. As a result, age plaintiffs cannot necessarily take
advantage of the identical liability theories available to workers
of color. Nor do age plaintiffs necessarily reap the benefit of all
the inferences and presumptions race plaintiffs enjoy. Courts do
not merely permit age plaintiffs to "step into the shoes" of race
plaintiffs in all circumstances. The rationale for failing to extend
disparate impact theory to age cases and the acceptance of cost
rationales rely, in part, on unconvincing statutory distinctions.
B. Similarities in Statutory Language Do Not Necessarily Result
in SimilarLegal Treatment
The statutory language that gives rise to liability for race and
age discrimination is strikingly similar. Both Title VII and the
ADEA prohibit discrimination "because of' race and age, respectively. The "because of" language of section 703 of Title VII gave
rise to two main liability theories--disparate treatment and disparate impact. 149 The ADEA's use of the same language to set the
liability standard suggests that the liability theories that operate
under Title VII should operate under the ADEA as well. Yet several circuits deny older workers access to the disparate impact
theory of liability.' In this instance, similarity in statutory language does not result in a similar interpretation. The result is a
confusing body of law that lacks clear guidance on when age discrimination cases are to be interpreted like race cases and when
they should be treated differently.

148. Just recently the Supreme Court held that the ADEA does not extend to "reverse"
age discrimination cases where a younger worker challenges favored treatment of older
workers. The Court's age decision stands in contrast to its acceptance of reverse discrimination in race cases. The Court supports its ruling, in part, by relying on "contextual
meaning" arguments that "age" as the term is used in the ADEA should be read more narrowly than the term "race" as used in Title VII. Compare General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 124 S. Ct. 1236 (2004), with McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co.,
427 U.S. 273 (1976) (recognizing reverse race discrimination cases).
149. Other theories of liability include harassment and failure to accommodate. See,
e.g., Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238-39 (5th Cir. 1971) (recognizing a cause of action
based upon maintenance of a discriminatory environment).
150. See infra notes 159-64 and accompanying text.
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Some parts of the race-based framework are adopted wholesale
into the age context. For example, the ADEA's "because of" language does give rise to disparate treatment theory, and the special proof structures plaintiffs must follow for disparate treatment cases adopted under the race model have been transposed
into the age model.' The same structure of proof applies in class
wide age discrimination cases as in class wide race discrimination
cases even though the ADEA does not explicitly provide for these
types of cases. 12
But, age cases also diverge from the race model. While an employer's refusal to hire a qualified black worker for an available
position generally is presumed to be evidence of unlawful motive,5 3 the same inference of discriminatory motive may not necessarily follow from satisfying the prima facie elements of age
discrimination. In Laugesen v. Anaconda,' the Sixth Circuit
questioned whether proof of the prima facie elements in an age
case should result in the same inference of discriminatory intent.
While it may not be unreasonable to assume that in a proper case
the guidelines established in McDonnell Douglas v. Green can be
applied in age discrimination jury cases, we believe it would be inappropriate simply to borrow and apply them automatically.

...Thus, while the principal thrust of the Age Act is to protect the
older worker from victimization by arbitrary classification on account of age, we do not believe that Congress intended automatic

151. The McDonnell Douglas structure of proof has been adopted in intentional age
discrimination cases. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993) (finding the
disparate treatment theory to be available under ADEA). For a more detailed explanation
of discrimination theories, see supra notes 20-44 and accompanying text. See also Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1122 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[An age discrimination plaintifli may utilize the indirect, burden-shifting method of proof for Title VII cases
originally set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.Green, and later adapted to age discrimination claims under the ADEA.").
152. Section 707 of Title VII authorizes the Attorney General to prosecute on a classwide basis where an employer engages in a pattern or practice of discrimination. Private
parties can also bring such class-wide actions under section 707. See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 325 (1977). There is no ADEA equivalent to Title VII's
section 707. Courts nevertheless apply the law as developed under Title VII to age discrimination claims. See Sperling v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1346 (D.N.J.
1996); see also King v. General Electric Co., 960 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1992); EEOC v. Western Electric Co., 713 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600 (10th
Cir. 1980).
153. See supra notes 90-105 and accompanying text.
154. 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975).
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presumptions 15to
apply whenever a worker is replaced by another of a
5
different age.

C. Most Courts Reject DisparateImpact Theory in Age Cases
Under Title VII, an employer is liable for unintentional practices that have a disparate impact on a protected group unless
the practice is justified by a business necessity." 6 Initially, most
courts assumed disparate impact theory applied under the
ADEA. 157 The trend now is against recognizing disparate impact
theory under the ADEA. 5 s The First,'5 9 Third, 6 ° Sixth,' 6 ' Seventh, 162 Tenth,6 3 and Eleventh" Circuits reject the disparate impact theory of liability under ADEA. The Supreme Court is set to
resolve this issue in Smith v. Jackson.'6 5 Certain justices have

155. Id. at 312, 313 n.4. See also O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517
U.S. 308 (1996) [hereinafter Consolidated Serv. Sys.], in which the Court stated:
We have never had occasion to decide whether that application of the Title VII
rule to the ADEA context is correct, but since the parties do not contest that
point we shall assume it.
The prima facie case... requires "evidence adequate to create an inference
that employment decision was based on an illegal discriminatory criterion .... ." In the age discrimination context, such an inference cannot be
drawn from the replacement of one worker with another worker insignificantly younger.
Id. at 311-13 (citation omitted) (quoting Int'l Bhd. Of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358).
156. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(K)(I)(A)(i).
157. See, e.g., Abbott v. Federal Forge, Inc., 912 F.2d 867, 870 (6th Cir. 1990) (presuming the application of the disparate impact theory); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State Coll.,
702 F.2d 686, 691 (8th Cir. 1983) (analyzing the case under a disparate impact theory).
158. The Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, following Title VII precedent, continue to
infer disparate impact theory under the ADEA. See, e.g., Frank v. United Airlines, Inc.,
216 F.3d 845, 856 (9th Cir. 2000); EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 191 F.3d 948, 950
(8th Cir. 1999); Criley v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 119 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1997); Lewis v.
Aerospace Cmty. Credit Union, 114 F.3d 745, 750 (8th Cir. 1997); Smith v. City of Des
Moines, 99 F.3d 1466, 1469-70 (8th Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Local 350, Plumbers & Pipefitters, 998 F.2d 641, 648 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993); EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 139495 (9th Cir. 1984); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980).
159. See Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 704 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 811 (1999).
160. See DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732 (3d Cir. 1995).
161. See Lyon v. Ohio Educ. Ass'n & Profl Staff Union, 53 F.3d 135, 139 n.5 (6th Cir.
1995).
162. See EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1076-77 (7th Cir. 1994).
163. See Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc. 73 F.3d 999, 1007 (10th Cir. 1996).
164. See Adams v. Florida Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1326 (11th Cir. 2001).
165. 351 F.3d 183 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 2386 (Mar. 29, 2004). The
Supreme Court was set to decide this issue in 2001 in the case of Adams v. Fla. Power
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signaled, however, that in their view disparate impact theory
should not necessarily apply in age cases.166
The rationales against the inclusion of disparate impact theory
in age discrimination cases rest, in part, on statutory arguments.
The Seventh Circuit in EEOC v. Francis W. Parker School,'6 7 for
example, focused on differences in statutory language to support
the court's conclusion that disparate impact is not available under the ADEA:
In the relevant statutory provisions, however, Title VII and the
ADEA differ in a significant way. Subsection (2) of Title VII's prohibitions, which was the basis for the Supreme Court's holding in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., proscribes any actions by employers which
"limit, segregate, or classify [their] employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." (citation omitted). The "mirror"
provision in the ADEA omits from its coverage, "applicants for employment." In light of the ADEA's nearly verbatim adoption of Title
VII language, the exclusion
of job applicants from subsection (2) of
1 68
the ADEA is noteworthy.

There are two basic arguments against recognizing disparate impact theory in age cases. First, differences in statutory language
reflect congressional intent to reject disparate impact theory in
age cases. 169 They argue, for example, that the inclusion in the
ADEA of the additional statutory defenses of "reasonable factors
other than age" and "good cause" impliedly rejects disparate impact theory. 7 ° Second, Congress's failure to amend the ADEA to
codify disparate impact into the statute after it amended Title VII
is tacit acknowledgement of Congress's intent to exclude disparate impact theory in age discrimination cases. 7 ' These formal

Corp., 255 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 534 U.S. 1054 (2001), but the Court dismissed certiorari. See Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 5345 U.S. 228 (2002).
166. 507 U.S. 604, 618 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring). In the concurring opinion in
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, signaled hostility toward disparate impact liability theory in age discrimination cases. Justice Kennedy wrote: "[N]othing in the Court's opinion should be read as incorporating in the ADEA context the so-called 'disparate impact' theory of Title VII." Id.
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
167. 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994).
168. Id. at 1077-78 (citations and footnote omitted).
169. See Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1008 (10th Cir. 1996).
170. See infra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
171. See id.
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rationales do not completely explain this divergence from the race
model.
The First and Eleventh Circuits, for example, argue that by including the "reasonable factors other than age defense" and "good
cause" defense, Congress must have intended that no disparate
impact liability apply in age cases.'7 2 According to this argument,
"reasonable factors other than age" include factors that may have
a disparate impact on older workers. Therefore, by recognizing
the "reasonable factors other than age" defense, Congress must
have intended to reject disparate impact theory in age cases. In
his dissenting opinion in Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 73 Judge
Easterbrook described the interplay between the ADEA's "reasonable factors other than age" defense and disparate impact theory. "74
' According to Judge Easterbrook, the "reasonable factors
other than age" defense in the ADEA "impl[ies] strongly that the
employer may use a ground of decision that is not age, even if it
varies with age," and even if it disparately affects older workers. "7' 5 Similarly, in Adams, the Eleventh Circuit justified rejecting the disparate impact theory in part based on the "reasonable
factors other than age" language that exists under the ADEA but
not Title VII.' 76 The Eleventh Circuit followed the reasoning of
the First Circuit that if the "reasonable factors other than age"
defense is not understood to preclude disparate impact liability,
"it becomes nothing more than a bromide"-a bit of circular reasoning "to the effect that 'only age discrimination is age discrimination.'"'77 Cost, for example, is a factor that is often correlated

172. See id.
173. 828 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 1211-22 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting); accord Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1125-26 (7th Cir. 1993).
175. Metz, 828 F.2d at 1220 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
176. Adams v. Florida Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1325-26 (11th Cir. 2001). The court
based its decision on four grounds: (1) the ADEA's exception for "reasonable factors other
than age" does not exist in Title VII; (2) the "reasonable factors other than age" exception
is similar to an exception to the remedial provisions of the Equal Pay Act that the Court
had interpreted as precluding disparate impact claims; (3) the legislative history of the
ADEA was unlike the legislative history of Title VII; and (4) the Supreme Court's decision
in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins suggested that no disparate impact claims could be brought
under the ADEA. Id.
177. Id. at 1325 (quoting Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 702 (1st Cir. 1999). In
Mullin, the First Circuit argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Biggins precluded
disparate impact claims in age cases.
Since disparate impact claims encompass the precise scenario that Justice
O'Connor describes [in Biggins]-disparateimpact assigns liability when employment practices are grounded in factors other than the statutorily protected characteristic (say, age), yet fall more harshly on individuals within
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with age and generally has a greater impact on older workersolder workers tend to have higher salaries, and vested benefits.
Some courts have held that when an employer makes decisions
based on a neutral factor such as cost, cost is a "reasonable factor
other than age" even though the factor disparately affects older
workers. 7 '
The second rationale posits that since Title VII was amended
in 1991 to codify disparate impact and the ADEA was not similarly amended, this means that Congress never intended disparate impact to apply in age cases."' The Civil Rights Act of 1991
made substantial changes to Title VII, including codifying disparate impact theory into the statutory language of Title VII. Congress did not (and has not) similarly amended the ADEA. The
failure to amend the ADEA does not necessarily undercut the argument that disparate impact theory should be available in age
cases. The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was a reaction
to Supreme Court cases cutting back the scope of Title VII in race
cases.
Of course these formal rationales cannot be dismissed out of
hand and may partially explain the differing outcomes, but they
are an incomplete answer to the question of why so many courts
reject disparate impact theory in age cases. The reluctance of
most courts to adopt disparate impact theory in age cases has
more to do with perceived differences between age and race than
just statutory interpretation arguments. The subtext of many of
these cases in which disparate impact theory is rejected is the
the protected group (say, older persons)-the inescapable implication of her
statements is that the imposition of disparate impact liability would not address the evils that Congress was attempting to purge when it enacted the
ADEA.
Mullin, 164 F.3d at 700-01.
178. See, e.g., Adams, 255 F.3d at 1325-26 (quoting Mullin, 164 F.3d at 702).
179. The Mullin Court cited Congress' failure to codify disparate impact theory into the
ADEA as proof that it did not intend disparate impact theory to apply.
The third factor that persuades us not to emulate the Griggs approach to Title VII in the ADEA context concerns more recent legislative developments.
In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to provide explicitly for causes of action
based upon disparate impact. It simultaneously amended the ADEA in myriad respects, but it did not create a corresponding disparate impact cause of
action.
[Tihis divergence helps to persuade us that Congress never intended to
make a disparate impact cause of action available under the ADEA.
Mullin, 164 F.3d at 703 (citations omitted).
...

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:839

courts' fundamental discomfort with treating older workers and
African American workers interchangeably.'80 In these cases
courts tend to emphasize differences between older workers and
workers of color to further support the outcome just as those who
argue in favor of allowing disparate impact claims in age cases
emphasize the similarities between discrimination faced by older
workers and faced by African American workers."8 1
D. Defenses
Courts accept a broader range of defenses to age discrimination
than to race discrimination. The different treatment is explained
in part by differences in statutory language. But, a close reading
of the cases suggests a more complex calculus goes into this determination. The statutory language that gives rise to defenses
under the ADEA is similar to Title VII's language in some respects and different in others. Like Title VII, the ADEA explicitly
recognizes a statutory BFOQ defense. 8 2 Both the ADEA and Title
VII except from liability otherwise discriminatory actions where
the actions are justified by a bona fide occupational qualification.

180. See, e.g., Alfred W. Blumrosen, Interpreting the ADEA: Intent or Impact, in AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT: A COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION MANUAL FOR
LAWYERS AND PERSONNEL PRACTITIONERS 68 (Monte B. Lake ed. 1982) (arguing that
ADEA based on "an intent to discriminate because of age" and the disparate impact theory
for age cases does not fall under ADEA); Douglas C. Hebert & Lani Schweiker Shelton, A
PragmaticArgument Against Applying the Disparate Impact Doctrine in Age Discrimination Cases, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 625, 627 (1996) (discussing no disparate impact theory for
age cases); Donald R. Stacy, A Case Against Extending the Adverse Impact Doctrine to
ADEA, 10 EMPL. REL. L.J. 437, 451-52 (1984-85); Nathan E. Holmes, Comment, The Age
Discriminationin Employment Act of 1967: Are DisparateImpact Claims Available?, 69 U.
CIN. L. REV. 299, 301 (2000); Pamela S. Krop, Note, Age Discriminationand the Disparate
Impact Doctrine, 34 STAN. L. REV. 837, 838 (1982); Evan H. Pontz, Comment, What a Difference ADEA Makes: Why Disparate Impact Theory Should Not Apply to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 74 N.C. L. REV. 267, 270 (1995); see also Mack Player, Title VII Impact Analysis Applied to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Is a
TransplantAppropriate?, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 1261, 1271-72 (1983) (discussing no liability
for adverse impact if practice is age neutral and reasonable).
181. These courts characterize Title VII and ADEA as having similar purpose-the
elimination of "stigmatizing stereotypes" on the basis of age and race. See Adams, 255
F.3d at 1326-27 (Barkett, J., concurring).
182. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000).
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Section 703(e)(1) of Title VII
provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, (1) it shall not be
an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to hire and employ
employees, for an employment
agency to classify or refer for employment any individual, for a labor
organization to classify its membership or to classify or refer for employment any individual, or for an
employer, labor organization, or
joint labor-management committee
controlling apprenticeship or other
training or retraining programs to
admit or employ any individual in
any such program, on the basis of
his religion, sex, or national origin
in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a
bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that
particular business
183
or enterprise.

Section 623(f) of the ADEA
provides:
It shall not be unlawful for an
employer, employment agency,
or labor organization-(1) to
take any action otherwise prohibited under subsection (a),
(b), (c), or (e) of this section
where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation i8of
the
particular
4
business.

The common law defenses of "legitimate non-discriminatory
reason" and "business necessity" are also recognized and applied
in age cases, but the scope of the defenses is expanded." 5
As discussed above, under Title VII the BFOQ defense applies
to employment decisions based on gender, religion, and national
origin, but not race. The presence of the BFOQ defense in age
cases is an important statutory distinction, but does not explain
why an age BFOQ might nevertheless be interpreted differently
from a BFOQ on the basis of the other protected groups-sex, religion, or national origin.

183. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
184. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1).
185. See Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 691 (8th Cir. 1983) (explaining that once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of age discrimination, the
burden of persuasion shifts to the defendants to prove that their selection plan was justified by a business necessity).
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The ADEA incorporates two statutory defenses that have no
direct Title VII counterpart, the "reasonable factors other than
age" defense 8 6 and the "good cause"18 7 defense.'
Rather than
looking at these statutory defenses as signaling differences between the race model and the age model, the "reasonable factors
other than age" defense and the "good cause" defense themselves
may be nothing more than codifications of the common law de89
fenses that have arisen under Title VII.1
E. The Cost Rationale

Cost rationales implicate another fundamental debate underlying anti-discrimination law in general and the differences between the race model and age model specifically. Neither Title
VII nor the ADEA makes direct reference to cost justifications as
an appropriate rationale supporting a defense to intentional discrimination. Yet, cost rationales have been formally rejected in
race cases. In age cases, on the other hand, the response is more
equivocal. Some courts reject cost rationales while others accept
them.

186. 29 U.S.C § 623(f)(1) provides: "It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor organization-(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under
subsections (a), (b), (c), or (e) of this section... where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age .... "
187. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(3) provides: "It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor organization-... (3) to discharge or otherwise discipline an individual for good cause."
188. The ADEA also contains an exception to its prohibition on mandatory retirement
for bona fide executives, police, and firefighters. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 631(c)(1), 623(j). The
ADEA also excepts bona fide employee benefit plans. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B).
189. See, for example, Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1328 (11th Cir. 2001)
in which the court stated:
In light of the parallels between the substantive provisions of the ADEA and
Title VII, and in light of the fact that Congress has amended the ADEA several times but has never explicitly excluded disparate impact claims, a reasonable interpretation of Section 623(f)(1) is that it codifies the business necessity exception to disparate impact claims.
Id.; see also EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1080 (7th Cir. 1994) (Cudahy,
J., dissenting) (asserting that reasonable factors other than age defense codifies the business necessity defense); Hiatt v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 859 F. Supp. 1416, 1434 (D. Wyo.
1994) ("It is at least arguable, however, that the modifier 'reasonable' could be interpreted
within the scheme of a disparate impact claim as encapsulating the defenses of business
necessity and job relatedness.").
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One of the major critiques of anti-discrimination law is that
such regulations are economically inefficient.1 9 ° However, in the
context of race, these arguments are generally rejected either because it is believed that such laws are efficient, that the benefits
of such laws outweigh the attendant costs, or that the moral imperative of ending race discrimination outweighs such economic
concerns. In age cases, however, cost rationales enjoy more general acceptance. While most courts appear to reject cost rationales based on inaccurate stereotypes or animus toward older
workers, a growing number of courts' 9 ' and commentators 192 consider cost a relevant and necessary consideration in age cases. 93
Initially courts following Manhart and other Title VII precedent formally rejected costs as a rationale in age cases, as well. In
Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., the Seventh Circuit determined that
the employer's desire to lower salary costs was not a legitimate
justification for replacing an older worker with a younger
worker.' The court reasoned that the ADEA shares the same focus as Title VII.' 9 5 Because of the high correlation between age
190. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex DiscriminationLaws, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 1311, 1312 (1989) (arguing that sex discrimination law is costly).
191. Some courts claim to reject cost rationales, but a close reading of the cases suggests that costs nevertheless creep into the decisions. See infra notes 223-27and accompanying text.
192. Professor Kaminshine argues that the use of salary costs as a criterion for layoffs
is economically rational. Since salaries tend to increase with age, attempts to cut salary
costs often burden older workers, but the burden is justified. Kaminshine, supra note 58,
at 231-33; see also Mark S. Brodin, Costs, Profits and Equal Employment Opportunity,62
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 318, 327 (1987) ("[C]ost justification has generally not upheld practices which are overtly discriminatory, but has with increasing frequency succeeded where
the challenged practice is neutral on its face but discriminatory in its operation.").
193. See Kaminshine, supra note 58, at 231-33. Professor Kaminshine describes the
inevitable tension between an employer's impulse to cut costs and the ADEA's goal of prohibiting discriminatory discharges of older workers.
Because these factors [seniority and longevity] correlate with age, older
workers can become more costly to compensate than their younger counterparts. This disparity creates significant tension during times of economic
stress when employers look to maximize savings by laying off or replacing
their costliest workers .... To the extent that the ADEA prohibits discriminatory discharges out of concern that displaced older workers face unique obstacles in finding employment late in their careers, seniority-related cost
comparisons can frustrate that objective. On the other hand, to require employers to ignore such costs as part of an economic cutback may equally frustrate the need for sensible cost-cutting policies.
Id. at 232-33. See also Issacharoff & Harris, supra note 22, at 798-99.
194. Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1206 (7th Cir. 1987). But see Anderson v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1125 (7th Cir. 1994) (questioning the majority decision of Metz in light of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Biggins).
195. Metz, 828 F.2d at 1220.
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and salary, it would undermine the goals of the ADEA to recognize cost cutting as a non-discriminatory justification for an employment decision.19 6 In Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College'9 7
a terminated college professor alleged age discrimination in the
college's choice of which faculty members were retained when
control of the city college was transferred to the state college system. 19 The court found that the college's use of salary as a factor
in the selection process had an adverse impact on older faculty
members.'9 9 The college offered a "cost savings" defense-its action was justified by a need "to reduce costs by eliminating some
positions at the college for tenured faculty who were generally
higher paid than the non-tenured faculty."2 °° Although the selection plan was based on tenure status rather than explicitly on
age, the court nevertheless rejected the employer's "cost savings"
defense because of the close correlation between the two factorsage and salary.2 ' The Eighth Circuit, then, adhered to the Title
VII approach to rationales.
Cost justifications, however, increasingly have found their way
into age cases. In Evers v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc.," 2 the court
concluded that the ranking process did not have a disparate impact on older workers, and that even if it did have such an impact, the economic necessity of layoffs constituted adequate justification.20 3 The plaintiff argued that the employer should be
forced to adopt an alternative budget with a less discriminatory
impact on older workers. 0 4 The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument for a less discriminatory alternative process.20 5 Employ
ees "presented no evidence that any of these alternatives would
result in cost savings comparable to those realized by the overall
reduction in force or that the alternatives would be less discrimi-

196. Id. at 1205.
197. 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983).
198. Id. at 689-90. A consultant hired by the college recommended a plan that would
reduce the faculty from fifty-one members to thirty-four. Id. at 689. Under the plan, the
new college had two positions available in the plaintiffs field-a tenured position and a
non-tenured position. Id. A sixty-two-year-old African American man was chosen over the
plaintiff for the tenured position; the plaintiff was not considered for the "non-tenure" position even though he received a higher score on the evaluation measures. Id. at 689-90.
199. Id. at 690.
200. Id. at 691.
201. Id.
202. 241 F.3d 948 (8th Cir. 2001).
203. Id. at 956.
204. Id. at 954.
205. Id. at 954-55.
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natory."2°6 This later Eighth Circuit decision signals a move away
from adherence to the Title VII approach and an openness to considering a properly supported cost rationale.
Because the ADEA contains statutory defenses that have no
Title VII equivalent-the "good cause"2" 7 defense, and the "reasonable factors other than age"20 8 defense, for example, it is in
these areas that cost justifications have made their boldest inroads in anti-discrimination jurisprudence. Courts have found
that costs are a "reasonable factor other than age," 209 and to the
extent the employer relied on costs, the employer had "good
cause"2 1 0 for its action. In Marks v. Loral Corp.,2 11 the California
Court of Appeals for the Fourth District held that a decision
based on a salary differential did not violate the ADEA or the
California prohibition of age discrimination.2 1 2 According to the
court, "[iif the goal of age discrimination statutes is to preclude
decisions based on generalities about older workers which may
have no basis as to individuals,then they certainly do not extend
to decisions based on relative compensation rates between individual workers." 213 The court also found statutory support in the
"reasonable factors other than age" defense under the ADEA.21 4
The court concluded that "[a] differentiation based on salary is as
'reasonable' a factor as is imaginable in a market economy., 215
The court recognized that while the "anti-cost" principle had been

206. Id. at 955.
207. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(3) ("It shall not be unlawful for an employer .... (3) to discharge
or otherwise discipline an individual for good cause.").
208. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) ("It shall not be unlawful for an employer,. . . (1) to take any
action otherwise prohibited ... where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors
other than age .... ").
209. See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993); Hanebrink v.
Brown Shoe Co., 110 F.3d 644 (8th Cir. 1997); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d
1073 (7th Cir. 1994); EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 733 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1984).
210. See, e.g., Kehoe v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 995 F.2d 117, 118 (8th Cir. 1993).
211. 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
212. Id. at 3-4. The plaintiff, Marks, was a member of the corporate finance staff at
Ford Aerospace (later purchased by Loral Corporation), which was relocated to California.
Id. at 4. Marks argued that, unlike his younger colleagues, he was not offered an opportunity to stay in Michigan after the unit relocated to California. Id. Later most of the corporate finance staff positions, including his, were eliminated in 1992. Id. Marks filed a subsequent claim, under federal, as well as state, age discrimination laws, that his age was a
factor in his not being able to secure another position within the company and that the
company had retaliated against him for his prior complaint. Id.
213. Id. at 8.
214. Id. at 9.
215. Id. at 9-10.
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rejected in the Title VII context, it was nevertheless appropriate
in an age case:
An objection to the use of price as a 'reasonable factor' is that
profitability has not been allowed to justify discrimination in other
civil rights contexts.

Salary differentials, however, present a matter qualitatively different from the usual disparate impact situation in a Title VII context. An action based on price differentials216represents the very quintessence of a legitimate business decision.

Although the case was overturned by statute,21 7 it nevertheless
remains instructive regarding the influence of cost concerns in
age discrimination allegations.
216. Id. at 10. In MuUin v. Raytheon Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d 165 (D. Mass. 1998), an older
executive whose position was downgraded and whose salary was reduced alleged that the
company engaged in age discrimination under both disparate treatment and disparate
impact. The court concluded that even if the policy had a disparate impact on some segment of older workers that the employer nevertheless demonstrated the necessity of the
policy.
Raytheon has produced uncontested evidence that the company suffered a
business contraction stemming from a downturn in the defense industry. Following plant consolidation and administrative restructuring, Raytheon's decision to reclassify many of its salaried employees was necessary to ensure that
salaries and labor grades were commensurate with the actual job responsibilities of those employees. Mullin has offered nothing to suggest that such parity
is not a necessary adjunct to a sound plan of business management, nor can
[h]e suggest any way that the company could have achieved its ends while imposing no disparate impact on its older workers.
Id. at 174-75.
217. California's age discrimination statute predates the federal statute. The California statute was first passed in 1961 as part of the Unemployment Insurance Code.
California Government Code section 12,491 now states:
The Legislature hereby declares its rejection of the court of appeal opinion in
Marks v. Loral Corp. and states that the opinion does not affect existing law
in any way, including, but not limited to, the law pertaining to disparate
treatment. The Legislature declares its intent that the use of salary as the
basis for differentiating between employees when terminating employment
may be found to constitute age discrimination if use of that criterion adversely impacts older workers as a group, and further declares its intent that
the disparate impact theory of proof may be used in claims of age discrimination. The Legislature further reaffirms and declares its intent that the courts
interpret the state's statutes prohibiting age discrimination in employment
broadly and vigorously, in a manner comparable to prohibitions against sex
and race discrimination, and with the goal of not only protecting older workers as individuals, but also of protecting older workers as a group, since they
face unique obstacles in the later phases of their careers. Nothing in this section shall limit the affirmative defenses traditionally available in employment discrimination cases including, but not limited to, those set forth in
Section 7286.7 of Title 2 of the California Code of Regulations.
CA. GOv. CODE § 12,941 (2003) (citation omitted).
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Courts have also recognized cost as a basis for "good cause" defense. In Kehoe v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,21 s the court found that
an employer could use cost justifications as a "good cause" defense to age discrimination.
Under the ADEA, employers are prohibited from discharging employees because of their age. The Act, however, specifically excludes
a discharge, which is based on good cause. In the present case, the
District Court held that Mr. Kehoe was dismissed as part of a plan
to reduce costs in order to meet tightening marketplace conditions.
This reasoning, if factually supported, would be sufficient to justify
Anheuser-Busch's actions under the ADEA.219

While cost justifications are more likely to occur in the context
of applying the "reasonable factors other than age" or for "good
cause" defenses,
cost rationales also crop up in connection with
traditional anti-discrimination defenses. Some courts maintain
that costs can be a "business necessity."2 21 In Evers v. Alliant
Techsystems, the Eighth Circuit upheld the "economic necessity of
layoffs" as a legitimate non-discriminatory reason without ever
addressing the Supreme Court's apparent rejection of costs as a
22 2 The
rationale for intentional discrimination in Manhart.
Supreme Court has not squarely decided whether reliance on salary
differentials violates the ADEA, but dicta in the Hazen Paper Co.
v. Biggins case seems to support the use of cost rationales in such
cases.2 23 In Biggins, the Court held that an employer does not
"discriminate" by relying on a factor correlated with age (such as
pension status).2 24 Under Biggins's reasoning, an employer's reliance on a salary differential, which is distinct from, but correlated with, age does not violate the statute.22 Biggins calls into
question the validity of cases like Metz where the court treated
salary and age as inextricably related.2 26 But the Court has yet to
fully embrace the cost justification defense in age cases.

218. 995 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1993).
219. Id. at 118.
220. See supra notes 186-189 and accompanying text.
221. Compare Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State Coll., 702 F.2d 686, 691-92 (8th Cir.
1983) (holding that cost justification was no defense to a claim of disparate impact of a
faculty reduction plant), with Evers v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 241 F.3d 948 (8th Cir.
2001).
222. Evers, 241 F.3d at 959.
223. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 612-13 (1993).
224. Id. at 612.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 612-13.
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As these cases demonstrate, courts increasingly deviate from
the Title VII model and acknowledge cost defenses in age cases.
Courts use the ADEA's statutory defenses or focus on other differences in ADEA's statutory language to justify relying on cost
justifications. But, as discussed in Part IV, above, when examined closely, the formal rationales are unsatisfying in many respects. The courts' actions, explicitly or implicitly, seem also
driven by a reliance on differences between the protected groups.
V. CROSS-CONTAMINATION
Today the protected classes extend to a majority of all Americans,
including white men over forty, short people, the chemically addicted, the left-handed, the obese, members of all religions. Surely
there is a scholar somewhere who can tell us how we came to this
state of affairs and how the road to civil rights became so
crowded... In our society, there were only so many fruits to go
around. When short, fat, old, white men step to the front of the
line.., then our civil rights are as endangered as they were by Bull
Conner and Sheriff Jim Clark twenty-five years ago.227

Anti-discrimination law does not provide a systematic method
for discerning when groups should be treated the same and when
they should be treated differently. This difference has lead to a
schism in the application of the anti-discrimination model in age
cases. Courts struggle to transpose the race model wholesale into
age cases when they do not appear convinced that the same assumptions and rationales that underlie the race model apply in
the age context. At the same time, courts often fail to acknowledge that they are treating age differently because of these differences. Without formal acknowledgement that they are in fact developing a different anti-discrimination model in age cases means
that these cases are added to general anti-discrimination jurisprudence and therefore raise at least the danger that creative
litigants will offer, and that uninformed courts will accept, arguments that undercut race. I call this process cross-contamination.
Cross-contamination refers to the process by which doctrines developed under one discrimination theory are often transposed
into the developing law under other statutes.2 2 This sharing of
concepts can provide positive benefits, such as economy and effi227.

PHILLIP K HowARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How LAw IS SUFFOCATING

AMERICA 132-33 (1994) (quoting Julian Bond).
228. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
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ciency, uniformity, and so on, and can lead to a greater understanding of the harm of discrimination.2 29 Yet, the reverse is also
true: restrictive concepts developed in one area can creep into
other areas, undercutting the goals of anti-discrimination law
generally. Courts must remain cognizant of the significant differences between protected groups when restricting the scope of the
law.
A. The HarassmentExample
The expansion of harassment as a theory of liability is an example of both the positive and negative benefits of crossborrowing. Such borrowing occurs both within and between statutes. Harassment as a form of discrimination was first held to
violate Title VII in the race context. Rogers v. EEOC,23 ° a race
case, was the first case to recognize a cause of action based upon
a discriminatory work environment. 231 The court reasoned that
employees should not be singled out by race to experience a different and less comfortable working environment than that experienced by workers of other races.23 2 This harassment theory
subsequently was adopted in sexual harassment cases. In Meritor
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,2 33 the Supreme Court cited Rogers
in support of its finding that an employee can state a cause of action for sexual harassment.2 3 4 In concluding that sexual harassment violates Title VII, the EEOC drew upon a substantial body
of judicial decisions and EEOC precedent holding that Title VII
affords employees the right to work in an environment free from
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.23 5
Harassment law also exemplifies the danger of crossborrowing. Courts have begun to borrow limiting concepts from
sexual harassment cases and to apply them to racial harassment

229. See, e.g., Grillo & Wildman, supra note 14, at 399-400.
230. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
231. Id. at 236-37.
232. Id. at 238.
233. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
234. Id. at 65-66.
235. See generally Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971); 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676
(1980). "Since the Guidelines were issued, courts have uniformly held, and we agree, that
a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on
sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment." Vinson, 477 U.S. at 66.
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claims.2 36 In particular, the concept of "unwelcomeness" has been
imported into racial harassment cases. In Vinson, the Court defined harassment as unwelcome sexual advances that create an
offensive or hostile working environment.2 37 "Welcomeness,"
traditionally, was not an issue in racial harassment cases, but
now some courts treat "unwelcomeness" as a required element in
racial harassment cases.2 3
B. The Import Problem
Wholesale application of anti-discrimination principles, from
race to age, potentially minimizes the distinctions and dilutes the
effectiveness of the theories. Minimizing the difference between
age plaintiffs and race plaintiffs has the unintended effect of obscuring the special needs of the intended beneficiaries of the
ADEA and contributes to general narrowing of anti-discrimination law in general.
The focus on comparisons between Title VII and ADEA has
steered courts to focus on limiting anti-discrimination theories in
age cases because age is not interchangeable with race. Little

236. See Hebert, supra note 13. Professor Hebert demonstrates how restrictive concepts in sexual harassment cases have been imported into racial harassment cases:
The explicit and implicit comparisons drawn by the courts between sexual
harassment and racial harassment have produced both of these positive and
negative effects. For some courts, drawing analogies between race and sex in
the context of workplace harassment has allowed the courts to understand and
to demonstrate the unlawful and discriminatory nature of sexually harassing
behavior. On the other hand, by importing into the racial context legal standards refined and given substance in connection with sexual harassment
claims-for which the courts have adopted a number of measures to protect
against what are perceived to be non-meritorious, trivial, or even frivolous
claims-the courts have made it increasingly difficult for employees to successfully establish the existence of a racially hostile or abusive work environment.
Therefore, for some courts, the use of analogies between racial and sexual harassment, rather than causing them to recognize the seriousness of sexual harassment, may in fact have caused them to take claims of racial harassment
less seriously.
Id. at 820 (footnote omitted).
237. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65. While the Court rejected the employer's argument that
harassment should be determined under a "voluntariness" standard, the Court, nevertheless, acknowledged the relevance of the plaintiffs "dress and personal fantasies" to determine whether the sexual advances were unwelcome. Id. at 63.
238. See, e.g., Motley v. Parker-Hannifan Corp., No. 1:94-CV-639, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7420, at *5 (W.D. Mich. May 10, 1995); Johnson v. Teamsters Local Union No.
559, No. 87-00215 FHF, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8181, at *9-10 (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 1995);
264, 265 Harris v. Int'l Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1512-14 (D. Me. 1991).
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thought is given to whether there exists a separate basis to support anti-discrimination theories in age cases based on age concerns alone. The focus should be on whether the doctrines separately advance the status of older workers. Disparate impact
should be recognized under the ADEA, not because of similarities
between race and age, but because disparate impact theory is
necessary to address the unique problems of older workers.23 9
Similarly, courts should view cost rationales warily, not because
such rationales are rejected under Title VII, but because they often mask just the type of economic opportunism that the ADEA
sought to prevent.
Often in age cases an employer has an incentive to terminate
the older worker because the older worker generally earns higher
wages. But the decision to terminate older workers to save costs
often does not take into account the older employee's overall wage
history. Often the higher wage earned at the end of the work career represents catch up payments from prior underpayments.24 °
Therefore on employer's "cost-based" rationale in an age case
may be nothing more than the employer taking opportunistic advantage of an older worker by terminating the older worker before the "catch up" payments fall due. Professor Jolls, for example, argues for applying disparate impact theory in age cases, not
because of the similarities between older workers and workers of
color, but because disparate impact theory is useful to address
problems specific to older workers. Because wages rise over time,
an employer has an incentive to rid itself of older, costlier workers. Jolls argues that this cost-based decision making nevertheless may be problematic because for most workers, higher wages
at the end of their employment life cycle are actually deferred

239. But cf Jolls, supra note 45, at 1841-44.
240. In an ideal work of economic harmony, one would expect that an employee's wage
would correspond to that employee's marginal product. Economists have long noted, however, that seldom does the wage paid to an employee correlate with that employee's marginal productivity. Economists use the term "life cycle theory of earnings" to explain this
seeming paradox. See, e.g., Duncan Brown & Michael Armstrong, Paying for Contribution
132-33 (1999). Employers often pay an employee more than the employee's marginal product at the beginning and end of an employee's career; wages fall below an employee's
marginal product during the middle years of an employee's career. The overpayment at
the beginning reflects training costs. The overpayment at the end is supposed to compensate the employee for underpayments that occurred during the middle years. The employer, than, has an incentive to discharge the employee in the later stages. Job mobility,
for example, generally prevents an employee from negotiating a long-term employment
contract to prevent the employer from discharging the worker in his later years.
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wages from earlier years."' Jolls argues that applying disparate
impact theory to such cost-based decisions could help curb such
employer opportunism.
1. Backlash
The last two decades have been witness to a general narrowing
of anti-discrimination principles. The perception is that discrimination in the workplace has been eliminated or, at the very least,
is not longer a major cause of adverse job actions. This is not a
new strategy.2 4 2 In some sense this backlash against antidiscrimination laws is to be expected. Title VII represented an
unprecedented attempt to reform social views on the limits of
such fundamental concepts as employment at will and freedom of
association. "[B]acklash tends to emerge when the application of
a transformative legal regime [such as Title VII] generates outcomes that diverge too sharply from entrenched norms and insti-

241. Jolls, supra note 45, at 1824-25.
242. Opponents of the 1964 civil rights bill suggested adding age as a protected characteristic under the employment provisions of the bill, hoping to defeat the entire bill. The
strategy failed. See 110 Cong. Rec. 9911 (1964) (statements of Sen. Smathers):
[T]here is about as much discrimination with respect to the employment of
people who get above 40 years of age as there is discrimination in any other
category which anyone can possibly imagine.
This proposed amendment to title VII of the pending civil rights bill
would seek to prohibit age discrimination in employment. Heretofore, during
the course of this debate, I have made it abundantly clear that I disapprove of
this title's coercive approach to discriminatory employment practices. I have
strongly criticized this title as an infringement upon the freedom of employers to choose their associates, contrary to the spirit if not the letter of the
Constitution. That I am now offering an amendment to that title in no way
implies any change in my opinion of it.
Id. Opponents of the bill tried a similar tactic in the House of Representatives. See 110
Cong. Rec. 2599 (1964) (Statements of Rep. Goodell):
[Wihat we are seeing here, in some instances with great sincerity and in
other instances less so, is an attempt, frankly, to load the bill with items and
factors that the bill is not designed to cope with.
The problem of this amendment [to add age] is that the whole framework,
and our whole section here was drawn especially to meet the very peculiar
problems of discrimination on the basis of race, creed, or color.
Discrimination based on age has an economic source. There are many
other factors that are very complicated in the problems of age.... We should
try to develop some machinery to deal with it. But this is not the vehicle by
which to do it.
Id. Instead, Congress directed the Secretary of Labor to study and prepare a report on the
problem of age discrimination. The Secretary's findings were presented to Congress in
1967. See The Older American Worker, supra note 29.
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tutions," to which the majority group belongs.2 4' Anti-discrimination law is, of course, just such a transformative legal regime.
But, the overemphasis on analogizing race to age facilitates the
backlash.
The attack on anti-discrimination laws has taken many forms,
some overt, some covert. The overt attack has taken the form of
vocal challenges to fundamental assumptions underlying the legislation, such as increasing judicial and social skepticism about
the extent to which race discrimination continues to operate in
society, increasing hostility to the continued use of remedial
techniques such as affirmative action and a growing sentiment
that the majority race is increasingly the victim of reverse discrimination.2 44 Instead, many groups attribute the still undeniable racial disparities in wages etc., to legitimate differences in
skills, education, abilities, and interests.24 5
The current affirmative action debate exemplifies the "retrenchment" that has taken place. 246 As originally conceived, affirmative action sought to remedy racial subordination by disestablishing the structures, institutions, and ideologies that
perpetuated racial inequity.24 v Opponents to affirmative action
have made progress advancing their cause by using the language

243. Linda Hamilton Krieger, Afterword: Socio-legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY. J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 476,477 (2000).
244. See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
245. One such website, "adversity.net," claims to be for "victims of reverse discrimination." Stop the Divine Emphasis on Race, at httpJ/www.adversity.net/defaultll_start.htm
(last updated Mar. 21, 2004). The group opposes the use of disparate impact theory in employment discrimination cases:
We strongly disagree with the politically-correct notion that test scores or
employment criteria which appear to have a "disparate impact" upon selected
racial, ethnic, or gender groups are inherently racist or sexist. In fact, most
instances of so-called "disparate impact" constitute a legitimate reflection of
differences in skills, education, and abilities.
Philosophy and Theory, at http://www.adversity.net/philosophy.htm (last updated Feb. 2,
2003).
246. Professors Charles Lawrence III and Mari Matsuda describe affirmative action as
one of the policies that arose out of the social changes occurring in America in the 1960s.
CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III & MARI J. MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go BACK: MAKING THE CASE
FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 18 (1997) ("Affirmative action was forged in the fire of urban
rebellion.").
247. The affirmative action policies as instituted never reached that ideal. Instead,
they reflected a compromise between those seeking to transform American society and
those fighting to maintain the status quo. "Affirmative action as we know it today is the
product of this era of rebellion and compromise. Powerful institutions made token concessions, partial payments on the demands for full equality, in an effort to purchase peace."
Id. at 25, 27.
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of anti-discrimination laws and turning the language "on its
head" by decrying affirmative action as an unfair race preference
policy that promotes "reverse" discrimination;
that it is inconsis248
tent with the goal of a "color blind society."
The covert attack has manifested in a more subtle undermining of the laws by exploiting vulnerabilities in the doctrine. Opponents of anti-discrimination laws have succeeded to a certain
extent in chipping away at the scope of the law's protections by
creating and preying upon public fears that anti-discrimination
laws extend too far and to too many.2 49 Phillip K. Howard levels
this charge in The Death of Common Sense: How Law is Suffocating America:
Rights, almost no one needs to be told, are all around us. The language of rights is used everywhere in modern America-not only in
public life, but in the workplace, in school, in welfare offices, in
health care. There are rights for children and the elderly; the disabled; the mentally disabled; workers under twenty-five and over
forty; alcoholics and the addicted; the homeless; spotted owls and
snail darters.... Rights have taken on a new role in America.
Whenever there is a perceived injustice, new rights are created to

248.

In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), Alan

Bakke, a white applicant, challenged the medical school's special admission procedure for
the consideration of applications for "disadvantaged" students. Bakke claimed the procedure allowed for less qualified applicants to gain admission and unfairly discriminated
against him because of his race. Justice Powell, who cast the deciding vote, struck down
the particular policy challenged by Bakke but determined that race could be considered in
admissions in certain circumstances. For a more detailed discussion of the impact of the
Bakke case, see LAWRENCE & MATSUDA, supra note 246, at 41-58. In the recent case of
Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2002), the Supreme Court struck down the University of Michigan's undergraduate admissions program, while upholding the admissions
program for the University of Michigan law school. Id. at 2347. In November 1996, California voters were asked to vote on "Proposition 209," called "The California Civil Rights
Initiative." Although described as a "civil rights initiative," proponents of Proposition 209
argued that civil rights laws had been hijacked by special interest groups through the use
of "quotas, set asides and preferences." Their stated goal of the initiative was to end "reverse discrimination." The initiative passed the California electorate by a 54 to 46% vote
on November 5, 1996. The initiative amended the California Constitution to add the text
of the "Civil Rights Initiative" to the California Constitution. See OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GEN. ELECTION, NOVEMBER 5,

1996, available at http://vote96.ss.ca.gov/Vote96/html/BP/ home.htm (last visited Mar. 31,
2004). A group called "Californians Against Discrimination and Preferences" ran the "Yes
on 209" campaign. For the text of the argument in favor of Proposition 209 that was included with the ballot, see Argument in Favor of Proposition 209, available at
http://vote96.ss.ca.govNote96/html/BP/209yesarg.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
249. See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992); PHILLIP K HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE:
How LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1994); WALTER K. OLSON, THE EXCUSE FACTORY:
How EMPLOYMENT LAW IS PARALYZING THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE (1997).
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help the victims .... While the rights-bearers may see them as "protection," they don't protect so much as provide. These
250 rights are intended as a new, and often invisible, form of subsidy.

As anti-discrimination laws have expanded to include additional groups, such as the elderly, courts have begun to look
askance at large and unwieldy protective clauses.25 1 The sheer
size of the protected group of older workers encourages courts to
interpret the ADEA narrowly.2 5 2 Courts' fear of expanding antidiscrimination law to such a large and unwieldy class of older
workers operates to subtly influence them to restrict the scope of
the law as applied in age cases. This trend is seen in the growing
number of courts that reject disparate impact as a theory of liability in age discrimination case and in the growing acceptance
of cost justifications as a defense to age discrimination cases.
The relative success of older workers in discrimination cases
fuels a growing misperception about the outcomes of discrimination cases. Among civil rights plaintiffs, age discrimination plaintiffs tend to fare better in the courts than other discrimination
plaintiffs.2 53 Ironically, the success of ADEA plaintiffs seems to
fuel a growing trend to limit the scope of anti-discrimination
laws. It fuels the perception that the law is being abused and the
courts overrun with meritless cases that result in huge damage
awards.2 54 These erroneous perceptions have led to a movement
to repeal or cut back on the scope of anti-discrimination laws. Despite the growing perception that discrimination in the workplace
has been eliminated or, at the very least, is no longer a major
cause of adverse job actions, workers of color continue to experience discrimination.

250. HOWARD, supra note 249, at 115-18.
251. Professor Michael Selmi argues that the breadth of the age discrimination state
explains courts' penchant for interpreting the statute narrowly. See Michael Selmi, Why
are Employment DiscriminationCases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 564-65 (2001).
Similarly, concern over the size of the potential class of the disabled has led to limits on
the scope of the Americans With Disabilities Act. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527
U.S. 471, 477-89 (1999) (restricting the definition of "person with a disability" and expressing concern with the potential size of the protected class under plaintiffs proposed
interpretation of the statute).
252. See Selmi, supra note 251, at 564-65.
253. Age discrimination cases are one of the fastest growing areas of employment litigation. For the year ending 2003, age discrimination claims accounted for 23.5% of individual charges filed with the EEOC, as compared to 25.4% for individual charges filed under Title VII for all types of discrimination. See EEOC Charge Statistics, supra note 7.
254. Ironically, the perception that there are huge numbers of meritless race discrimination claims being brought and huge damage awards received is not the case. See Selmi,
supra note 251, at 557-61 for data compiled by the Administrative Office of the Courts.
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While Title VII may have successfully broken down formal barriers based on race, it has done little to transform the underlying
2 55
institutions that continue to subordinate on the basis of race.
Disparities in employment persist despite the passage of laws
seeking to eradicate it. 25 6 Intentional job discrimination continues
to affect negatively blacks, Hispanics, Asian-Pacific and white
women."'5 Yet civil rights plaintiffs (including older workers who
fare the best) fare worse in court than other civil plaintiffs, save
prisoners. A civil rights plaintiffs trial victory is more likely to be
reversed on appeal than a plaintiffs victory in other types of civil
cases (42% versus 6%). Defense verdicts in civil rights cases are
rarely reversed. Yet there is a rising intransigence in the courts
and in public opinion to cases seeking to redress these disparities.
2. The ADEA's Unmet Goals
Age discrimination litigation is among the fastest growing type
of employment discrimination cases. Despite the volume of litigation, many of the ADEA's goals remain unmet. The ADEA sought
255. LAWRENCE & MATSUDA, supra note 246, at 77 ("The effect of this ideology of formal equality, is to make it possible to pretend that racism doesn't exist."); Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformationand Legitimization in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1371-76 (1988) (criticizing antidiscrimination law for failure to address the subordination of African Americans); see Alan
Freeman, AntidiscriminationLaw from 1954 to 1989: Uncertainty, Contradiction,Rationalization, Denial 285-309, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David
Kairys, ed., 3d ed. 1998) (describing the myth of meritocracy and failure of civil rights law
to obtain equal opportunity); see also KWAME TURE & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, BLACK
POWER: THE POLITICS OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA 3-5 (1967) (describing racism as "the
predication of decisions and policies on considerations of race for the purpose of subordinating a racial group and maintaining control over that group" and describing institutional racism as "originat[ing] in the operation of established and respected forces in the
society" and relying "on the active and pervasive operation of anti-black attitudes and
practices").
256. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Understanding Affirmative Action, 23
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 921, 966-67 (1996). In 1990, black, male workers earned $731 for
every $1,000 earned by a white, male worker. Id at 966. Black, male college graduates
earned $798 for every $1000 earned by their white counterparts. Id. According to 1995
statistics, black women earned 10% less than white women and 36% less than white men.
Id. at 967. Black women with professional degrees in top management positions earned
60% of the salaries of their white male counterparts. Id. Further, black workers are disproportionately represented in the ranks of low wage earners. Id. "Although blacks constitute 12% of the population and 10% of the workforce, they fill over 30% of the nursing aide
and orderly jobs and almost 25% of the domestic servant jobs, but only 3% of the jobs for
lawyers and doctors." Id. at 967.
257. See Alfred W. Blumrosen & Ruth G. Blumrosen, The Reality of Intentional Job
Discriminationin Metropolitan America-1999, available at http://law.newark.rutgers.edu
//blumrosen-eeo.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
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to remove formal age barriers. It was successful in ending mandatory retirement. The ADEA also sought to increase the employment rates for older workers and limit employers' ability to
opportunistically terminate older workers to avoid paying higher
wages. With respect to employment rates, the ADEA has not been
successful in this regard. The employment rates for older workers
are no better than they were before passage of the ADEA. Rather,
it appears that the primary beneficiaries of the ADEA are white
men, a subgroup within the class of older workers, while older
minority women are among the poorest in society. 2 8 "[Wihile
older workers who remain employed are often very well paid,
those who use their positions frequently find themselves unable
to obtain comparable employment.2 5 9 The ADEA, then, has become a bit of protectionist legislation for established workers, but
generally ineffective in accomplishing its goal of creating new job
opportunities for older workers.
C. The Export Problem
In general concepts that have entered one area of antidiscrimination law have extended to other areas of the law and
encompassed new groups-a positive development in the law for
the most part. But, as these concepts have been stretched near to
breaking, they render the law vulnerable to attack. The growing
resistance to allowing disparate impact claims in age cases and
the increasing approval of employer cost justifications are two
ways in which the court restricts the scope of anti-discrimination
remedies in age cases. These restrictions parallel attempts to restrict anti-discrimination law under Title VII. While these comparisons are not always explicit, those attempting to limit dispa-

258. Previous studies have shown that white male professionals bring the majority of
age discrimination claims. A 1984 analysis of 153 federal court cases alleging ADEA violations showed that fifty-seven percent of the cases were brought on behalf of white men in
professional and managerial occupations. See Michael Schuster & Christopher S. Miller,
An EmpiricalAssessment of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 38 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 64-68 (1984); see also George Rutherglen, From Race to Age: The Expanding
Scope of Employment DiscriminationLaw, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 491 (1995). Professors Issacharoff and Worth argue that the ADEA allows a small group of older workers to use antidiscrimination law to unjustifiably capture wealth for themselves. Issacharoff and Harris
identify three areas of unjustified wealth capture: early retirement incentive plans, pension severance offset programs and supplemental employment benefits. See Issacharoff &
Harris, supranote 15, at 813-19.
259. See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., Cases and Materials on Employment Discrimination 6 (6th ed. 2003).
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rate impact theory, for example, take advantage of the general
hostility toward anti-discrimination, a hostility furthered in part
by the expansion of the law to older workers. Richard Epstein alludes to this export problem:
The basic congressional theme of parity of treatment for different
forms of discrimination carries over to this context: the major implication is that since Title VII is desirable, the ADEA must be desirable as well. But the argument also works in reverse: that is, on its
face the ADEA is no more desirable than the other
antidiscrimina260
tion provisions found under the civil rights law.

Epstein uses the extension of anti-cost rationales to age discrimination to support his argument that all anti-discrimination laws
are inefficient.
1. Disparate Impact
Before the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Title VII disparate impact
theories were under attack. The Supreme Court in Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio26 1 substantially cut back the scope of disparate impact law.262 The case was reversed in part by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.
Congress's codification of disparate impact theory into the
statutory language of Title VII limits the ability to attack disparate impact theory directly. Nevertheless, litigants have attempted to use the Court's hostility to disparate impact in age
cases to attempt to limit the availability of disparate impact in
race cases in other contexts, under other anti-discrimination statutes. In National Fair Housing Alliance, Inc. v. PrudentialIns.
Co. of America ,23 a fair housing case, the district court rejected
the defendant insurance company's argument that the Fair
Housing Act should not recognize disparate impact claims based
on the Supreme Court's Biggins decision. 2" "While defendants

260. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 444 (1992).

261. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
262. For a discussion of the impact of Wards Cove on disparate impact theory as well
as the effect of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in partially reversing Wards Cove, see Kingsley
R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A "QuotaBill," a Codificationof Griggs, a Partial
Return to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV 287 (1993).
263. 208 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
264. Id. at 58-60.
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argue that [the Supreme Court's decision in Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins] also suggests the Supreme Court's hesitancy to extend
the disparate impact doctrine, that case concerned the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, a statute that
differs signifi265
VII."
Title
and
FHA
the
from
structure
in
cantly
2. Cost Justifications
Cost rationales, formally rejected under Title VII, are more accepted in age cases. Such cost defenses have not remained confined to age cases, but contrive to seep into other areas of antidiscrimination law. An ever vigilant civil rights community has
been successful in beating back many, but not all of these attempts.
In Wards Cove, the Supreme Court found that cost was relevant in determining whether a proposed alternative practice was
equally as effective as the prohibited practice in serving the employer's business goals.266 In Wards Cove, the plaintiffs challenged a myriad of policies that they contended resulted in a racially segregated workforce. 26 7 The employers argued that costs
factored into the assignment of housing. The Supreme Court
found that "factors such as the cost or other burdens of proposed
alternative selection devices are relevant in determining whether
they would be equally as effective as the challenged practice in
serving the employer's legitimate business goals."26" The Civil
Rights Act of 1991 reversed much of the Wards Cove decision.26 9
Two years after Wards Cove, dicta in International Union,
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,27° for example, raised the possibility that costs could constitute a valid BFOQ under Title VII in
271 Johnson Controls
the future.
involved a challenge to the em2
ployer's fetal-protection policy. 2 The Court rejected the em-

265. Id. at 60 (citation omitted).
266. Ward's Cove, 490 U.S. at 661.
267. Id. at 647-48.
268. Id. at 661.
269. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in various
sections of 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III 1992)).
270. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
271. Id. at 208-11.
272. Id. at 190.
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ployer's attempt to use safety concerns to justify excluding fertile
women from certain jobs in its battery-manufacturing plant. 3
The concurrence of Justice White, with Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Kennedy, disagreed with the majority opinion to the
extent the majority held that the BFOQ defense could never justify a sex-specific fetal protection policy.2 74 They argued that under appropriate circumstances, costs could support application of
the BFOQ defense.
[A] fetal protection policy would be justified under the terms of the
statute if, for example, an employer could show that exclusion of
women from certain jobs was reasonably necessary to avoid substantial tort liability. Common sense tells us that it is part of the normal
operation of business concerns to avoid causing injury to third parties, as well as to employees, if for275no other reason than to avoid tort
liability and its substantial costs.

This language stands in contrast to language in earlier cases
where courts rejected cost as a justification for application of the
BFOQ defense. In Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 276 the district
court rejected the employer's argument that its female-only flight
attendant policy was necessary to ensure the airlines competitive
success with its mostly male passengers. 7 The court stated,
"[w]ithout doubt the goal of every business is to make a
profit .... [However] [i]f an employer could justify employment
discrimination merely on the grounds that it is necessary to make
a profit, Title VII would be nullified in short order."27 Courts
have also rejected employer's arguments that the cost of providing facilities or housing for female workers justifies a genderbased BFOQ 9

273. Id. at 191-92. Johnson Controls instituted a policy prohibiting "women who are
pregnant or who are capable of bearing children" from holding certain jobs involving lead
exposure. Id. at 192. The employer argued that its policy did not discriminate on the basis
of sex and that, even if it did, the company could raise a valid BFOQ defense based on protecting the safety of the unborn fetus. Id. at 195. The district court and the Seventh Circuit both ruled in favor of defendant-employer. Id. at 193. The Supreme Court reversed.
Id. at 211.
274. Id. at 211 (White, J., concurring).
275. Id. at 212-13 (White, J., concurring).
276. 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
277. Id. at 304-05.
278. See id. at 302 n.25.
279. See Michael L. Sirota, Sex Discrimination:Title VII and the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification,55 TEX. L. REV. 1025 (1977).
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In fact, there is evidence that cost justifications have been subtly raised and relied on in race cases despite the strong mandate
by the Supreme Court that cost is irrelevant."' In EEOC v. Consolidated Service Systems, 2 11 for example, the EEOC alleged that
the owner of a small company intentionally discriminated on the
basis of race by relying on word-of-mouth hiring practices.28 2 The
court concluded that word-of-mouth hiring did not violate the
statute because it was the cheapest method of recruitment.
If the most efficient method of hiring, adopted because it is the most
efficient... just happens to produce a work force whose racial or religious or ethnic or national-origin or gender composition pleases the
employer, this is not intentional discrimination.

It is not discrimination, and it is certainly not active discrimination,
for an employer to sit back and wait for people willing to work for
low wages to apply to him. The fact that they are ethnically or racially uniform does not impose upon him a duty to spend money
283 advertising in the help wanted columns of the Chicago Tribune."

The Supreme Court has yet to decide a case that directly raises
this issue. The Johnson Controls concurrence and changes to the
composition of the Court since Johnson Controls may suggest
that, contrary to popular opinion, Manhart may not have settled
the cost justification issue. If the Court would consider recognizing a cost justification under any aspect of Title VII, it is not
much of a leap to imagine the same "prohibitive cost" rationale
would at some point become available in race discrimination
cases as well.
VI. CONCLUSION

Both courts and litigants must pay closer attention to the
cross-contamination problem. Indeed, courts must make clear
when their decisions limiting anti-discrimination law are in response to differences between the nature of the discrimination

280.
Brodin,
281.
282.
283.

For a description of how cost justifications have "crept" into race cases, see
supra note 192, at 337-57.
989 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 234.
Id. at 236-37 (citations omitted).
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faced by age plaintiffs and race plaintiffs and resist attempts by
those who seek to undermine anti-discrimination law and even
those who seek to expand the law, not realizing the potential
unintended harmful effects.
As discussed above, I am not suggesting that courts cut back on
the scope of age laws. To the contrary, the protection for older
workers may very well merit expansion. Courts need not analogize to race to justify the application of disparate impact theory in
age cases or to reject cost rationales, for example. Separate rationales support these outcomes. But, to the extent courts accept
restrictions in the age context, they should not export them to
race cases.
Legal protections against some types of age discrimination in
the workplace are necessary. But there are also important differences between the treatment accorded to the protected group of
older workers and attempts at ending subordination on the basis
of race. Failure to acknowledge those points at which age discrimination differs from race discrimination renders antidiscrimination jurisprudence vulnerable to being undermined by
its opponents. If the courts do not acknowledge important distinctions between race and age, then limiting concepts developed in
age discrimination cases, such as costs, should logically be applicable in race cases as well. Such applications could seriously undermine the rights race plaintiffs have gained or hope to gain.

